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SUMMARY
An orphaned nuclear detonation in an urban environment would create enormous pres-
sure on policy makers to act quickly requiring strong attribution evidence. Traditional post-
detonation nuclear forensic science focuses on delayed particulate collection methods and
lengthy laboratory analyses which impedes availability of empirical attribution evidence.
Therefore, characterization of passively measurable prompt emissions emanating from a
nuclear detonation, within 60 seconds, bolsters traditional post-detonation nuclear forensic
collection and analyses. Passively measurable emission detectability limits require catego-
rization into peri-detonation nuclear forensics or prompt phenomena occurring within 60
seconds and post-detonation or delayed phenomena following 60 seconds. Because of the
competing physical effects and number of unknowns that affect prompt emissions, global
and local sensitivity methods must be employed for determining which device character-
istics can be determined at early-times. The results of these sensitivities and trends aid a
Monte Carlo Filtering matching algorithm that accurately determines yield, fuel-type(s),
mass, and height-of-burst from hypothetical photon emissions produced by simplified Fat
Man and Little Boy design derivatives. Additionally, signatures emanating from nuclear
cloud rise between approximately 3 and 60 seconds clarified ambiguous results from the
Monte Carlo Filtering algorithm, reducing uncertainty and improving accuracy. Superior
Monte Carlo Filtering accuracy and lowered uncertainty indicates promise of using signa-
tures from nuclear cloud rise as diagnostic indicators, if earlier data is destroyed or unavail-
able. Additionally, experimental photon emission sensitivities were shown with varying
masses of 239Pu within 0.01 seconds of irradiation using selected energy ranges from the
47-group photon energy structure. The derived early signatures may provide policy makers





Post-detonation nuclear forensics is a broad and complex problem spanning multiple sci-
entific disciplines. The complexity, uncertainty, and limitations related to post-detonation
nuclear forensics require statistical methods/models to study passively measurable radioac-
tive emissions. These methods extract and highlight pertinent information from passively
measured signatures to expedite the attribution process. To facilitate attribution time line re-
duction, the importance metrics developed through statistical methods are used to highlight
the most relevant experimental and computational results. In parallel, experimental assess-
ment of detector technology provides constraints on data availability and provides realistic
input parameters - detector capabilities - for modeling and simulation. Most importantly,
the results limit conclusions and inferences related to device reconstruction/characteristics
primarily affecting attribution conclusions. The overall research goal is to expedite the attri-
bution process by determining detonation characteristics and design features from prompt
nuclear forensic indicators considering current detection capabilities and limitations.
1.1 Problem Context
Following a nuclear detonation in an urban setting, chaos, devastation, and radioactivity
hinder early efforts to collect fallout samples. Surviving static monitoring stations and air-
sampling methods are options for collecting debris. All collection methods contain a time
delay; potentially extending the nuclear forensic time line and corresponding attribution.
In the event of a nuclear attack, real-time technical nuclear forensics information shortens
the forensic time line moving attribution earlier. Additionally, advancements in technical
nuclear forensic capabilities strengthen nuclear deterrence strategy.
The Nuclear Forensics and Attribution Act of 2010 concerns thwarting a nuclear ter-
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Figure 1.1: Fat Man (left) and Little Boy (right) devices. Determining these designs fol-
lowing detonation is on the order of weeks following start of laboratory analysis.
rorist attack against United States’ interests [1]. The act facilitates development of nuclear
forensic science/attribution capabilities for ascribing a nuclear attack with the goal of using
the attributive ability as a deterrent against the use and proliferation of nuclear weapons
[1]. Conceivably, terrorist organizations lack defined borders and centralized government
causing attribution to be insignificant. In all likelihood, a terrorist organization would relish
being attributed to a nuclear attack. Therefore, direct deterrence has less of an effect, if any,
against nuclear terrorism. Lack of organizational borders also poses a problem because pro-
ducing material for a nuclear device requires complex processes, facilities, and machinery.
Organizational and production challenges may force terrorists to acquire nuclear material
or device from a state source.
1.2 Nuclear Forensic Background
Nuclear forensic science is considered a new field within the nuclear treaty monitoring
community. The science provides a deterrent of using nuclear weapons by bolstering a
strong attribution program [2]. Pre- and post-detonation nuclear forensics each present
challenges ultimately affecting attribution. The complexities and breadth of challenges
force post-detonation forensics to be divided into peri- and post-detonation categories.
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1.3 Peri-Detonation Nuclear Forensics
Because of the differing emission production pathways, this research isolates phenom-
ena and emissions into prompt or peri-detonation and delayed or post-detonation effects.
Peri-detonation phenomena encompass initial nuclear radiation output by the fireball and
early-stages of the radioactive cloud. The peri-detonation period ends and post-detonation
nuclear forensics begin once prompt output is no longer distinguishable/detectable. For
clarity of the period boundaries, gamma rays emitted by fission and fission products from
a 20 kiloton (kt) detonation have an effective distance of roughly 2 miles. Once the ra-
dioactive cloud from a 20 kt blast reaches 2 miles, the initial radiation has little effect,
which is near one minute [3]. Therefore, peri-detonation effects span up to one minute
while post-detonation encompasses effects greater than one minute. Each period presents
its own challenges and holds information about device characteristics needed for attribu-
tion purposes. Extracting relevant information during the peri-detonation period requires
computational statistical methods, such as sensitivity analysis (SA), because of inhibiting
phenomena that obscures prompt emissions.
1.4 Sensitivity Analysis Application to Peri-Detonation Nuclear Forensics
The abundance of variables affecting radiation emission from a detonation requires the
use of sensitivity analysis (SA). SA is a versatile tool for studying input-output models
benefiting the researcher by determining [4]:
• model accuracy
• significant factors and insignificant parameters of the model
• regional maximums and minimums of model variation
• optimal regions in factor space for desired response
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• factor interactions
SA can be divided into screening, local, and global methods. Screening methods pro-
duce qualitative measures on the output response while local methods produce “local” one-
factor-at-a-time (OAT) measures on the output response. Global SA methods relate uncer-
tainty in the output response to the possible distribution of the input factors or uncertainty
[4]. The amount of data and variables associated with early-time emissions require the use
of global SA techniques. Passively measurable signatures following a nuclear detonation
are energy dependent and evolve over time. In this case, global SA methods determine the
time-dependent importance of input variables (i.e. fuel-type, neutron spectrum shape, flux
magnitude, etc.). Simply, this analysis has the ability to “sift” through the noise associated
with passive detection and highlight only the dominant variables.
Additionally, Monte Carlo filtering (MCF) can greatly benefit the nuclear forensic sci-
entist. MCF rejects sets of model simulations that fail to match a predetermined result or
constraint often called “acceptable behavior [4].” The goal is to simply identify factors that
contribute the most to the desired pre-selected output [5]. MCF, in this research, assigns the
“unknown” photon emission spectrum as the output or constraint. Realistically, the “un-
known” cases would be truly unknown in the field but in this case derivative designs were
chosen to mimic Fat Man and Little Boy pure fission devices. Through Monte Carlo sam-
pling of the input variables, the factors or groups of factors that create the desired photon
spectrum are categorized as behavioral or acceptable.
1.5 Peri-Detonation Nuclear Forensic Experimental Problem Context and Motiva-
tion
Computationally determining sensitivities related to photon production contain uncertainty
in the data used for analysis. The theory and data itself is derived from experimental re-
search and observations. Experimental analyses present their own challenges when related
to peri-detonation detectability. The prompt time scale of the event places heavy empha-
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sis on the detection system employed which ultimately dictates information availability.
Connecting computational and experimental results/limitations is invaluable for advancing
peri-detonation nuclear forensic analyses.
For perspective of the time scale, the burnup period of a nuclear detonation is a fraction
of a microsecond [3]. Logically, device reconstruction should begin closest to time zero as
possible because the device is partially intact and revealing clues through prompt radiation
emission. Information from the fissioning fuel, structural components, and energy output
is present in this tiny window and expedites attribution evidence production. Gaining the
most information in this short period is vital in peri-detonation nuclear forensics placing
requirements on the detection system employed. Assessing current detection technologies




DETERRENCE BY EARLY-TIME ATTRIBUTION: PERI-DETONATION
NUCLEAR FORENSICS
Whether clandestine, an act of terrorism, or warfare, a nuclear detonation creates a momen-
tous impact on the world that is impossible to quantify. No matter the pathway to non-state
nuclearization, the potential for a nuclear detonation by a non-state actor or clandestine
operation shifts the scales to improvement of safeguards and nuclear treaty monitoring ca-
pabilities.
2.1 Peri-Detonation Nuclear Deterrence
The unknown magnitude of effects stemming from a nuclear detonation requires all deter-
rent strategies to be implemented. During the Cold War, the nuclear powers were known
and the consequences/outcomes of an attack were also, to some extent, known. Because of
this, nuclear deterrence was arguably a byproduct formed through the development and ac-
quisition of nuclear weapons. The U.S. began shifting its deterrence strategy from attacking
dense population regions to more targeted action which was addressed in many speeches of
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara (1961-1968), calling for a Single Integrated Op-
erational Plan (SIOP) that focused on the destruction of military targets [6]. These public
statements on strategic nuclear war policy further demonstrate the clear lines of engage-
ment and targets. Clarification of nuclear strategy is also demonstrated by the appearance
of the mutually assured destruction (MAD) strategic doctrine in the 1960s [6]. Another
example involved the U.S. withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002 for
development of smaller and more accurate nuclear weapons [6]. When defined borders
and somewhat known retaliation measures/consequences exist, expanding and moderniz-
ing nuclear capabilities deter aggression and use of nuclear weapons. Objectives of nuclear
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weapon use during the Cold War was strategic and military driven, producing a level of
predictability. Conversely, the wide range of possible motivations and predictability of
terrorism and rogue nations have changed the balance of nuclear deterrence.
Deterrence research following the collapse of the Soviet Union began moving towards
other threat sources. September 11, 2001 firmly shifted deterrence strategy to include
asymmetric threats from terrorist and rogue nations. The strategy change also brought into
debate the magnitude deterrence would contribute to national security policy [7]. Whether
a centralized or subtle role, WMD deterrence, specifically nuclear, in a constantly changing
threat spectrum must be itself adaptive and be comprehensive - including nuclear forensics.
Jeffrey W. Knopf categorizes nuclear forensics into a sub-category of “fourth wave” deter-
rence strategy [7].
Extensive research has been done on deterrence strategy. Historically, during the Cold
War era, deterrence was categorized into three waves. These waves were focused on direct
state conflict that was prevalent and most likely at the time [7]. Most relevant, the third
wave attempted to bring empirical evidence into deterrence strategy that was lacking in the
previous two waves. Additionally, the third wave highlighted historical deterrence strategy
failures [8]. The third wave research had clear focus on strategy related to state actors while
fourth wave addresses deterring asymmetric threats such as rogue nations and terrorists.
Nuclear forensic science arguably provides a direct and indirect deterrent. The Com-
prehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization’s international monitoring systems have
conceivably deterred above ground nuclear testing while strong attribution capabilities de-
ter potential proliferation sources. With respect to asymmetric threats, nuclear forensic
science is most applicable to the fourth wave deterrence strategy. Fourth wave deterrence
strategy employs several deterrents such as denial, punishment, indirect methods, and non-
military options such as delegitimization [7]. If nuclear terrorism occurred, the device
would likely take these forms, in order of casualties and likelihood: (1) a radiological dis-
persal device (RDD), (2) an improvised nuclear device (IND), or (3) a sophisticated nuclear
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device (SND). The SND and material for the IND likely will be gained/diverted through a
sophisticated source. Thus, deterring the potential source is the next logical step. Hence,
nuclear forensics creates an indirect deterrent to the source of the nuclear device or ma-
terial. Displaying advanced - empirical - capabilities of attribution would enable fear of
discovery and subsequent retaliation to the source country. There are technical challenges
related to timely data availability and uncertainty.
Researchers have brought up several concerns with post-detonation nuclear forensics
contribution to deterrence. The main technical concern is the availability of samples for
comparison to the blast debris. Also, for nuclear forensic science to be a deterrent, the
capabilities would need to be public information and reach potential source states. This
requirement is a double-edged sword as known capabilities highlight vulnerabilities. Al-
though, public release of nuclear forensic funding, active research, and vague capabilities
possibly dulls one-side of the blade. Another hurdle directly applicable to this research is
timeliness of post-detonation results.
Deterrence research has focused on physical debris collection for nuclear treaty moni-
toring and forensics purposes [1] [7]. For instance, a nuclear terrorist attack was deemed
“the most serious threats to the national security of the United States.” This act placed heavy
emphasis on development of nuclear forensics program for attributing a nuclear detonation.
Per section 2 of the Nuclear Forensics and Attribution Act, many of the radioisotopes pro-
duced by a detonation are short lived requiring timely sample collection. Expedient sample
collection requires obtaining atmospheric debris for analysis. According to the Nuclear
Forensics and Attribution Act, atmospheric sample collection capabilities have diminished
over the past several decades. Development and advancement of this capability creates an
effective indirect deterrent against the use or proliferation of nuclear weapons[1]. Obtain-
ing and analyzing debris from a nuclear detonation takes considerable time. Devastation
following a nuclear detonation will place extreme pressure on the policy makers to act.
Peri-detonation nuclear forensics provides objective data to the policy maker for consider-
8
ation. Although the data is limited at these early times compared to laboratory produced
data, the coarse information may provide actionable data. The subtle underlying challenge
then becomes relating limited empirical evidence associated with peri-detonation nuclear
forensics to confidence of decisions.
While current U.S. Congress opinion on creating a strong and credible nuclear deterrent
is advancement and maintenance of the nuclear triad [9]. The Nuclear Forensics Attribution
Act directs developing/advancing the technical nuclear forensics capability to strengthen
the collective response of the United States to nuclear terrorism or other nuclear attack.
Post-detonation nuclear forensic science produces scientific evidence that can be applied
for attribution. Furthermore, if law enforcement and intelligence determined the source of
attack they will require supporting evidence [10] - partly originating from post-detonation
technical nuclear forensic conclusions. The ability of nuclear forensic science creating a
modern, indirect, nuclear deterrent to the transfer of nuclear capabilities from a weapon
state bolsters the effectiveness of the U.S. governments attribution capabilities.
2.2 Advantages and Limitations of Post-Detonation Nuclear Forensics
Obtaining an early-time sample of nuclear device debris for analysis following a nuclear
detonation is challenging. Radioactivity levels, fire, debris, and blast damage potentially
hinders early-time efforts for airborne or ground sample retrieval. Assuming it was possi-
ble, the subsequent radiochemical forensic analysis potentially extends the attribution time
line further due to the detailed separation processes.
Speculated timelines from pre-detonation estimates place determination of nuclear ori-
gin and explosive yield within hours. Preceding laboratory analysis, a sample must be
collected and transported to a laboratory. Scientists could then determine the isotopic com-
position and rough material history days after laboratory analysis began. Then the fuel-
type and sophistication level can be determined. Determining device design and match-
ing known designs take place several weeks after laboratory analysis [11]. This timeline
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provides concern if early-time attribution is desired. Average political action from conven-
tional attacks is 19 days with a median of 10 days [12]. Political action would arguably be
similar following a nuclear attack.
Current prompt diagnostic systems carry associated uncertainties and are likely to be
affected by the environment in between the burst and sensor location. However, prompt
diagnostic systems offer timely data on an event compared to airborne and ground materi-
als collection methods. Obtaining and analyzing an airborne sample is a likely early-time
option for materials/debris collection. The U.S. has two WC-135 “Constant Phoenix” air-
planes in service for treaty monitoring that may be available for nuclear forensics appli-
cations [13]. These airplanes recover airborne radioactive particles. The requirement of
flying through a radioactive cloud may hinder extremely early analysis/collection because
of high activities present. Early-time ground debris collection is also complicated due to
the extremely high radioactivity. There is also a Ground Filter Unit (GFU) network con-
sisting of particulate sampling using filter paper and distillation devices that can collect
complementary samples to the WC-135. Unfortunately, the GFU network requires sam-
ples to be physically removed and shipped to laboratories [14]. Laboratory equipment has
been found to be far more superior than field instruments [11].
Passively measurable signatures provide a mechanism to gain early-time attribution in-
formation. Current networks of systems, such as the CTBTO’s International Monitoring
System can detect a detonation event, but can infer very little about the device itself. These
existing infrastructures focus primarily on secondary signatures from a detonation, such as
speed of sound phenomenology (seismic, hydro-acoustic etc.) and volatile fission products.
These tools can provide some information in a short period of time; however, limitations
do exist and tends to be associated with a high degree of uncertainty [15]. A more promis-
ing route is to measure primary signatures such as photons and neutrons because of their
underlying properties. Measurements of these early-time emissions, will be referred to in
this research, as peri-detonation nuclear forensics. Increasing knowledge and modeling of
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such peri-detonation phenomena potentially provide high-impact contribution to nuclear
forensic science.
2.3 Peri-Detonation Nuclear Forensics Contribution to Nuclear Detonation Charac-
terization
A domestic nuclear detonation requires a cohesive contingency structure following the
event [16]. Many challenges are present following a detonation mainly mitigating fur-
ther loss of life and consequence management. Strategically, attribution and (potential)
retaliation are the main drivers for nuclear forensic science.
The broad field of post-detonation nuclear forensics offers many methods of informa-
tion extraction mostly from laboratory analysis of collected debris. Due to the associated
nanosecond timescales, peri-detonation forensics is potentially capable of obtaining direct
measurement of the device itself. Because peri-detonation encompasses prompt burnup,
the structure and fuel of the device are partially intact at the time of measurement and emit-
ting passively measurable radiation. Fissioning material and promptly activated structural
component signatures are only present during and shortly after the prompt burnup period,
well before laboratory or field analyses can take place. Indications of fuel type, structural
components, and energy output can correlate to information relating to the device.
The severity of consequences involving a nuclear detonation requires due diligence with
respect to the collection/analysis of nuclear forensic evidence. In the case of an orphaned
nuclear detonation, providing a definitive/accurate answer weeks to months later can be
detrimental. Peri-detonation forensics can provide a middle ground, by providing informa-
tion within 60 seconds, but with some associated uncertainty. Peri-detonation forensics is
not expected to supersede existing methods, but to complement by gathering information
at a crucial time, when scientific data is scarce.
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2.4 Peri-Detonation Nuclear Forensic Challenges
The information extracted by peri-detonation forensic methods is constrained by detec-
tor technology, weapon effects, environment, and inherent physical uncertainties. These
extreme circumstances mitigate the ability to correlate measurable output to device char-
acteristics ultimately impeding the amount of information available. Examining factors
that affect determination of device characteristics places restrictions on conclusions due to
uncertainty and reveals other relationships between device output and characteristics.
Many factors influence the ability to gain early time information from passively mea-
surable signatures. Weapon physics, weather, and structures/materials found in an urban
environment can negatively affect signal production and propagation. If signal were avail-
able, the ability to detect the emissions is the next logical challenge.
The conditions surrounding a nuclear detonation within an urban environment are some-
what unknown, but must be accounted for when measuring the emission output. Because
the time of detonation is unknown, the deployed detector technology would require rugged-
ness. Also, the distance from the blast would dictate the amount of signal in the detector
requiring a large array or crystal. The largest hurdle for detection is simply the existence
of a detector in the blast vicinity. Custom detection systems would need to be strategically
placed for information gathering. Additionally, leveraging existing monitoring stations or
networks behavior following a blast is possible in gaining early-time information. Conse-
quently, peri-detonation technology deployment and development is likely costly.
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CHAPTER 3
PERI-DETONATION SENSITIVITY/UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS TECHNICAL
APPROACH AND RESULTS
Early-time determination of nuclear device design features and detonation characteristics
require statistical methods capable of revealing subtle characteristic artifacts from prompt
emissions. Device physics, environmental factors, competing variables (e.g. different
fuel types, flux magnitude and shape), and other exacerbating factors oftentimes obfuscate
meaningful information found in prompt emissions. One method of determining variable
importance is applying sensitivity analysis to prompt emissions. Saltelli offers a defini-
tion of sensitivity analysis (SA) as the study of the uncertainty in the model output can
be apportioned to different sources of uncertainty in the model input [17]. SA aids the
researcher in understanding the underlying laws or rules of the system and the effect on the
desired responses or outcomes. Peri-detonation nuclear forensic SA focuses analysis to a
critical region of the system revealing early-time exploitable characteristics. Specifically,
the effects of model inputs - device design features - on passively measurable radiation
and deduction limitations of device characteristics. Peri-detonation system behavior and
relationships are determined by multiple sensitivity methods.
3.1 Sensitivity/Uncertainty Analysis Methods and Background
SA offers many useful purposes in modeling complex systems by exposing technical errors,
identifying dominant regions in the input space, simplifying models, and guiding research
priorities [17]. SA has many methods, sub-categories, and metrics. A complement to
SA, Monte Carlo Filtering (MCF), allows the researcher to determine needed behavior
for a desired outcome (e.g. conditions required for a given detector response or photon
spectrum). This research employs local, global, and MCF methods.
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3.1.1 Local Sensitivity Analysis
Local SA methods primarily use partial derivatives for the computation of sensitivity in-
dices. The dependence of an output response,Yi, on an input variable, Xj, can be shown
with the partial derivative, ∂Yi/∂Xj. This method is limited when the model input is uncer-
tain and of unknown linearity [17]. The derivative is oftentimes unnormalized and simply
based on the raw input and output values resulting in variables demonstrating equal impor-
tance on the output response. Oftentimes, weighting the partial derivative with the standard
deviations of the input/output reveals input variable importance. Shown below in Eq. 3.1







As previously mentioned, local sensitivity measures (sigma-normalized and unnormal-
ized) do not provide perspective of ranking input variables on the desired output response.
However, the sigma-normalized partial derivative can be further normalized to unity, pro-
viding a pseudo-ranking system of input variable importance. A simplified method of




2 = 1 (3.2)
Another method in gaining a local sensitivity metric is to simply plot the dependent
and independent variables. Examining the trend between the independent and dependent
variables can provide insight into the correlation between the variables. Simply, fitting a
line and determining the strength of fit of the plotted data provides an empirical correla-
tion metric or the pseudo-main effect coefficient between the dependent and independent
variables.
The above local methods provide sensitivity metrics between the input variables - de-
sign features - and output response but does not account for potential interactions between
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the input variables or any nonlinearities in the model. Sobol developed a method for de-
termining a variable’s total effect on an output response which provides insight into any
variable interactions and nonlinear associations.
3.1.2 Global Sensitivity Analysis
Local SA methods are, by name, bound to “local” regions of the input space often using
one-factor-at-a-time (OAT) calculations. Global methods have the ability to examine all
regions of the input space. Variance decomposition is one such global method. Saltelli et
al. offers 4 “settings” for SA [5]:
• Factors Prioritization (FP): determination of which variable to fix that causes the greatest
reduction in output uncertainty.
• Factors Fixing (FF): identification of noninfluential factors or groups of factors.
• Variance Cutting (VC): determination of the least amount of input variables to reach a
prescribed level of output uncertainty.
• Factors Mapping (FM): identification of dominant factors that produce a desired output
response.
Conveniently, variance based SA methods are conducive in determining FP, FF, and VC
points. The last item encompasses MCF methods which are discussed later.
Variance Decomposition Background
Beginning with a model denoted by the function Y = f(X). All factors spanning their
ranges of uncertainty are denoted by the X. The function’s total variability results from
contributions from all variables and is known as the unconditional variance, denoted by
V (Y ). Logically if an input value was known, the associated uncertainty from that input
variable would be removed from the output response. Therefore by setting an input variable
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to a “known” amount, Xi = x∗i while varying other variables gives the amount of output
variance associated with the input variable. VX∼i(Y |Xi = x*i ) is the variance of Y taken
over all factors but Xi or X∼i. This measure is also called the conditional variance [5].
The conditional variance should be less than the unconditional variance because of only
one variable being frozen. This inequality allows VX∼i(Y |Xi = x∗i ) to become a ranking
system of the input variables. Although, there is a problematic high dependence on x∗i ’s
input space position. This dependence is removed when x∗i is averaged over all values [17]
and the formulation is shown below in Eq. 3.3. The property shown in Eq. 3.4 allows for
an importance measure to be ascertained.
EXi(VX∼i(Y |Xi)) (3.3)
EXi(VX∼i(Y |Xi)) + VXi(EX∼i(Y |Xi)) = V (Y ) (3.4)
By weighting the conditional variance, VXi(EX∼i(Y |Xi)), by the unconditional variance,





A high Si value equates to a high-importance for the input variable. This value is the
main effect contribution to the variance in the output for each input variable. Si mimics a
correlation coefficient between the model output and the input variable. Correlation coef-
ficients are not suited for nonlinear relationships in the model indicating only estimates of
linear relationships. A total sensitivity measure that takes into account nonlinearities and
interactions between variables is needed.
Sobol’s variance decomposition method calculates a total sensitivity index that encom-
passes all main and higher-order effects from interactions. The notation V (E(Y |Xi)) is
used for VXi(EX∼i(Y |Xi)). Sobol introduced decomposing the unconditional variance of
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a model with k input variables into a sum of all conditional variances shown in 3.6 [5].








Vij + ...+ V12...k; (3.6)
where:
Vi = V (E(Y |Xi))—main effect of Xi; (3.7a)
Vij = V (E(Y |Xi, Xj))− Vi − Vj—joint effect of Xi and Xj sans their main effects;
(3.7b)
Vijm = V (E(Y |Xi, Xj, Xm))− Vij − Vim − Vjm − Vi − Vj − Vm; (3.7c)
The process continues up to 2k−1 unconditional variances which is referred to as the curse
of dimensionality. Eq. 3.6 can then be divided by V (Y ) resulting in Eq. 3.8. Sobol’s
total effect index, shown in Eq. 3.9 for a 2-variable model, reveals the additive nature of









Sij + ...+ S12...k = 1; (3.8)
ST1 = S1 + S12 (3.9)
Sobol’s variance decomposition method reveals the behavior of the model output due to
input variables. Calculating all sensitivity indices requires a high computational cost. This




This research uses Monte Carlo sampling for determination of sensitivity indices. The
variables studied/sampled were: neutron spectrum (shape), flux (magnitude), and fuel-type
(238U, 235U, 233U, 239Pu). All variables were sampled over uniform distributions.
For the neutron spectrum shape, samples were generated by moving from a Watt Spec-
trum to a pure high-energy (HE) Dirac delta function at 14 MeV. The perturbation method
for the group dependent spectrum shape is found in Eq. 3.10 [18]. Perfetti uses this method
for perturbation of the prompt fission neutron emission spectrum or chi spectrum probabil-
ity. This perturbation method assumes changing the emission probability in one energy
group affects all energy groups.
P (ni=g)
′ = P (ni) + δP (ng)
P (ni 6=g)
′ = P (ni)
1− P (ng)− δP (ng)
1− P (ng)
where:
P (ng): Probability of neutrons in group g.
(3.10)
To guarantee coverage of average neutron energies, Ēneutron, a stratified sampling method
was also used. Stratified sampling divides the uniform distribution into even segments
based on the number of total samples to assure sampling within each region. The flux
magnitude was sampled between 1.0E+26 - 1.0E+30 neutrons
cm2−second . Fissile and fissionable
fuels were also uniformly sampled. For primary fuel types, 235U, 233U, 239Pu, masses were
sampled between 3.0 and 50.0 kilograms. The secondary fuel type or reflector, 238U, was
sampled between 0.0 and 1000.0 kilograms.
3.1.3 Monte Carlo Filtering
Monte Carlo filtering (MCF) is an SA method used in diagnostic modeling. By setting
a predetermined constraint, the model is conditioned to best mimic the desired behavior.
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Prior distributions of model input values are sampled and evaluated based on the proxim-
ity to the desired behavior. The prior statistical distributions represent uncertainty in the
system. This classification system is related to the first-order effects discussed in Section
3.1.2. MCF makes no attempt to explain higher-order effects or variable interactions [5].
For this research, MCF is used to determine the most-likely design features and character-
istics based on the prompt photon output. Uncertainties in the nuclear data are considered
for MCF methods but not in acceleration schemes.
3.1.4 Uncertainty Analysis
There are many sources of uncertainty associated with computational simulations. Simu-
lated photon emission uncertainties lie within the nuclear data and geometry specifications.
These cross-section uncertainties create a fluctuation/distribution of possible device yields
which are used for scaling the prompt photon emissions and generating fission products.
The prompt fission, radiative capture, and neutron inelastic scatter photon emission distri-
bution is also affected by cross-section uncertainty. A distribution of yields is shown below
that arise from cross-section uncertainties in Fig. 3.1.
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Figure 3.1: Yield distribution from cross-section uncertainties.
Fission product photon uncertainties contain more sources of error. The decay con-
stants, fission product yields, cross-sections, and power uncertainties dominate the time/energy
dependent photon emission uncertainty. Scale’s Sampler module was used to quantify the
time and energy dependent photon uncertainty. Sampler quantifies uncertainties associated
with the multi-group cross-sections, decay and fission yield data, along with geometry in-
put. The module uses Monte Carlo sampling of the probability density functions (PDF),
rather than perturbation methods which require separate forward and adjoint calculations
[19]. The Sampler module was used to generate the perturbed input decks. A custom
routine was written to process and run the Sampler module for added uncertainty quantifi-
cation related to photon emissions. The routine propagated the prompt power uncertainties
through the Oak Ridge Isotope GENeration (ORIGEN) generated photon emissions. Nu-
clear data uncertainties are used in the MCF algorithm reference case photon emissions.
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Noteworthy, nuclear data uncertainty was not considered with the acceleration scheme
or each MCF run. This is due to the unreasonable amount of samples/calculations needed
per random configuration generated. Alternatively, detailed uncertainty analysis was com-
pleted on the reference cases. Realistically, the reference spectrum would contain measure-
ment/counting error while the MCF runs would contain error related to nuclear data and
modeling uncertainty. Mimicking this logic, the energy and time dependent uncertainty
calculated for the reference cases were applied to the MCF randomly generated configu-
ration. Matching sequences were run to determine if the reference case falls within the
generated MCF run.
3.2 Monte Carlo Filtering Affirmation, Search Parameters, and Reference Cases
MCF requires a known photon spectrum for comparison to the random Monte Carlo gen-
erated photon spectra. Once a Monte Carlo generated model was run, the output photon
spectrum was compared to the reference spectrum. The randomly generated configurations
contain various fuel types, densities, reflectors, and resulting yields. Several methods are
employed to determine the proximity to the reference spectrum. Because MCF requires
a predetermined constraint, several “known” test cases were considered. In reality, these
“known” test cases would be unknown in the field but would still serve as a constraint.
Their corresponding photon spectra are stored and serve as the MCF constraint. Simply,
the MCF constraint is the photon spectrum the algorithm is trying to match. All photon
spectra have used the same detector response functions. These response functions yield
a convenient uncertainty bound on the photon energy bins. Logically, a configuration is
matched if the rate or counts in the photon energy bin from the reference case falls within
the range of nuclear data uncertainty in the MCF run. To determine proximity, several
metrics are used on the reference and randomly generated configuration spectrum.
Because the reference spectrum contains error associated with counts and nuclear data,
the randomly generated spectrum is checked against the upper and lower bounds of the ref-
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erence spectrum and assigned a score based on “passes.” The integral counts, detection rate,
and ratios are compared between each generated case and assigned a score. A chi-squared
metric is then applied and divided by the degrees of freedom to determine the distance away
from the reference spectrum. Additionally, the reference spectrum and randomly generated
spectrum are both normalized to unity. This normalization forces the algorithm to exam-
ine the shape of the photon spectrum rather than the magnitude which is more indicative
to fissioning or activated structural components. Each of the metrics used in the scoring
function are shown below in Eq. 3.11.
Scoring Function

















Distance between reference spectrum and generated spectrum
(3.11)
To provide a brief description of the scoring function, these metrics are applied to the
prompt burnup front-end period to initially filter the results. After a spectrum passes the
first filter, nuclear cloud rise is simulated with the filtered results and assigned scores based
on the same formula. Simply, results passing the first filter are further scrutinized by grad-
ing the signatures emanating from the nuclear cloud rise period. This second filter is meant
to analyze fission product photon emission, neutron activation in the cloud, and lingering
fuel-type emissions. Fortuitously, by applying realistic detector settings and characteris-
tics, the matched MCF configurations highlight the effect of technology capabilities on
conclusions.
The possible fuels and reflectors that are considered are shown in Tables 3.1 and 3.2
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with their corresponding weight fractions [20]. Combinations of these fuels and reflectors
are used for randomly generating different configurations. The resulting photon spectrum
of the randomly generated configuration is then compared to the reference case spectrum.
Table 3.1: Fuels and corresponding compositions used in Monte Carlo Filtering analysis.
Fuel Type Composition [Weight Percent]
Weapons Grade Pu
(WGPu)
238Pu: 0.05, 239Pu: 93.50, 240Pu: 6.0
241Pu: 0.40, 242Pu: 0.05
Fuel Grade Pu
(FGPu)
238Pu: 0.10, 239Pu: 86.1, 240Pu: 12.0
241Pu: 1.60, 242Pu: 0.20
Aged Weapons
Grade Pu (AWGPu)
238Pu: 0.01, 239Pu: 93.63, 240Pu: 5.99
241Pu: 0.20, 242Pu: 0.03, 241Am: 0.14
Pure 239Pu 239Pu: 100.0
Highly Enriched
Uranium (HEU)
234U: 0.98, 235U: 93.16, 236U: 0.45
238U: 5.42
Pure 235U 235U: 100.0
Pure 233U 233U: 100.0
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Table 3.2: Reflectors and corresponding compositions used in Monte Carlo Filtering anal-
ysis.
Fuel Type Composition [Weight Percent]
Natural Uranium (NatU) 234U: 0.0057, 235U: 0.7204, 238U: 99.2739
Tungsten
180W: 0.12, 182W: 26.23, 183W: 14.24
184W: 30.66, 186W: 28.76
Lead
204Pb: 1.38, 206Pb: 23.96, 207Pb: 22.07
208Pb: 52.59
Iridium 191Ir: 37.06, 193Ir: 62.94
Air
NatC: 0.01, NatN: 75.53, NatO: 23.18
NatAr: 1.28
Because the spatial model employs a MCF algorithm, reference cases are needed for
comparison to the model runs. The first case mimics Little Boy (Uranium) and Fat Man
(Plutonium) design types using open source mass estimates and randomly selected densities
[21] [22]. The reference cases are shown in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Reference cases used for Monte Carlo Filtering analysis.
Design Derivative Fuel Type, Mass [kg], Density [ g
cm3
] Reflector Type, Mass[kg], Density [ g
cm3
]
Fat Man Pure 239Pu, 6.2, 31.6 NatU, 100.0, 28.0
Little Boy Pure 235U, 34.4, 28.0 N/A
These design derivatives were chosen because of geometry and sophistication differences.
The Fat Man derivative was an implosion type device with a NatU reflector. A smaller fissile
mass was required because of the reflector and implosion technique which was a higher
level of sophistication compared to the Little Boy derivative. The Little Boy derivative was
a gun-type design with no reflector requiring more fissile mass. These two design types
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show the effects of bare versus reflected assembly photon emissions and varying levels of
sophistication.
The overall goal of the MCF algorithm is to find a behavioral match to the reference
spectra. In order to complete this task, 5 computational calculations (labeled Sections (i)
- (v)) and 1 sub-step (Section (i.a)) were performed and are described in the following
section.
3.3 Peri-Detonation Nuclear Forensic Computational Analysis Technical Approach
The preceding variance decomposition method provides two metrics for variable impor-
tance. First-order or main effect index values show the linear strength between the input
variables and model output - time and energy dependent photon emissions. Total sensi-
tivity index values provide insight into nonlinearities and interactions between the input
variables. Comparison of these two metrics invaluably highlights the underlying system
behavior and dependencies. Notably, the metrics are also used in developing the MCF
acceleration scheme.
Additionally, the level of complexity and breadth of the problem justify several limiting
assumptions in this work. Prompt-phenomena encompasses several scientific disciplines
further justifying placing scoping limits on the problem. All assumptions and methods are
found in open-source literature and are intentionally simplified. The associated phenomena
and assumptions are grouped in each corresponding calculation section. For clarity, the
following section describes the computational workflow used in this research.
The overall calculation progression is shown below in Fig. 3.2 which is broken up
into sections (i)-(v) with a sub-section (i.a) for MCF acceleration. The MCF acceleration
scheme was developed from using the global and local sensitivity indices which highlighted
relevant energy bins for each fuel and reflector type. These relevant energy bin to input vari-
able relationships allowed for rough determination of present fuel types. Sub-sections to
follow describe calculation methods in detail, but a brief overview description is provided.
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Figure 3.2: Flow diagram of computational calculations.
Before section (i) or section (i.a), global and local sensitivity analyses are completed
using the Oak Ridge Isotope GENeration (ORIGEN) code which produced point-source
photon emissions to highlight which energy bins and energy ratios can be used for the
MCF acceleration step. Section (i) is the MCF acceleration calculation that uses the found
relationships developed in section (i.a) to lower the possible MCF input space. The accel-
eration scheme is completed on integral counts between 1.00E-05 and 1.00E-01 seconds in
the determined energy bins. In Section (ii), a 1-D discrete ordinates transport calculation
is completed to provide neutronic properties and constants that allow for calculation of en-
ergy output (device yield) which dictates prompt fission, activation, and inelastic scattering
photons. Section (iii) uses material compositions and spatial power levels from Section
(ii) to produce point source fission product and spontaneous fission photon emissions in
the ORIGEN code. Section (iv) solves a set of ODEs cited from the Defense Land Fallout
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Interpretive Code (DELFIC) code to yield temperature, material composition/density, and
cloud radius. The DELFIC parameters and the photon source from section (iii) are inserted
into a final 1-D discrete ordinates transport calculation in section (v) as the geometry and
independent photon source, respectively. All the described calculations are used to gener-
ate an energy- and time-dependent photon spectrum that is compared to the reference case,
discarded or kept, and then the process repeats. Before the MCF algorithm begins, the
acceleration calculation is completed for computational speedup by narrowing down the
possible input space.
In this research, Section (ii) is referred to as the prompt front-end (shown in red above),
while Sections (ii) - (v) are grouped in prompt back-end phenomena. This segregation is
shown below in Fig. 3.3.


































] Peri-detonation Front-End Period
Peri-detonation Back-End Period
Figure 3.3: Peri-detonation spatial front and back-end model divisions.
The coarse grouping into front/back-end phenomena serves multiple purposes. Physically,
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the prompt front-end burnup period (hypothetical unboosted fission) contains photon emis-
sions from the fissioning fuel/reflector, (n, γ), and inelastic scatter (n, n’γ) reactions (among
others) from structural components/fuel. Also, these front-end emissions grossly outnum-
ber fission product photons. At this stage, the device is - mostly - intact and not decon-
structed revealing real-time design hints.
3.3.1 Peri-Detonation Global/Local Sensitivity Metric Development – Section (i.a)
The point-source model Sensitivity Analysis (SA) is completed on the entirety of the in-
put space with and without detector response functions to develop photon spectrum signa-
tures/relationships related to short-lived fission products. SA reveals underlying connec-
tions between the input variables and photon signal (i.e. linearity, variable interactions, and
monotonicity). These relationships then serve as an acceleration scheme that shrinks the
model input space used in the spatial MCF calculation, improving computation time.
The developed point-source model exclusively uses the ORIGEN point depletion code.
ORIGEN produces highly idealized isotopic and emission inventories and does not include
fission or activation photons which are required for prompt analyses [23]. Also, ORIGEN
is a point-source model which inherently does not account for attenuation, absorption, and
scattering. Although limited, the ORIGEN point-source model serves as a good method
development tool, shows overall trends in the data, highlights variable behavior, and ac-
celerates MCF calculations. The point-source model can also mimic a radioactive sample
found in the field after a nuclear detonation sans fission and activation photons.
For MCF acceleration purposes, this step also considers the integral counts between
1.00E-05 and 1.00E-01 seconds which is between the prompt burnup photon emission and
infancy of nuclear cloud rise. Detector response functions were included in the predictive
relationships developed. The relationships are meant to significantly lower the input space
available to the MCF algorithm. Uncertainty in the acceleration scheme resulting from
nuclear data was not considered because of the lengthy calculation time.
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Variables considered in the point-source SA are: neutron spectrum (shape), flux (mag-
nitude), and fuel-type (238U, 235U, 233U, 239Pu). Using the methods in section 3.1, time and
energy dependent total/first-order sensitivity indices are calculated for each variable using
the methods introduced in Section 3.1. All data was stored in version 9.6 PostgreSQL
databases and post-processed.
Due to the initial high temperatures, unfractionated samples were the primary research
focus. Although because the nuclear cloud cools considerably within 60 seconds, trends of
chemically fractionated samples were examined due to the differing elemental condensa-
tion temperatures which determine presence in the cloud.
Chemical Fractionation
If a nuclear detonation occurs near the surface of the Earth, the fireball will uptake the
contacted environment. Some of this debris will be vaporized along with the device com-
ponents, fuel, and fission products. As the fireball amalgamation begins to cool, the fission
products and other debris constituents condense based on their respective condensation
temperatures. If the condensation temperatures of the debris constituents are higher than
the carrier material, the device constituents are distributed volumetrically in the fallout
particles. A lower condensation temperature causes the device constituents to be surface
distributed [24][25]. Freiling offers a definition of fractionation as “any alteration of ra-
dionuclide composition occurring between the time of detonation and the time of radio-
chemical analysis which causes the debris sample to be nonrepresentative of the detonation
products taken as a whole [25].” An illustration of fractionation is shown in Figs. 3.4 and
3.5.
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Figure 3.4: Refractory and volatile nature of mass chains 76 and 95.
Figure 3.5: Freiling ratio bounds and mass chain 95 which is considered pure refractory.
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Computational methods for fractionation were developed using the ORIGEN code.
ORIGEN has the capability to output the isotope inventory of gamma ray emitters. A
Freiling ratio can be set (FR) or calculated for each photon energy group. The formulation














atomsi atoms of mass chain i volume distributed at solidification time
atomstotali total atoms in mass chain i
F issionsi is the number of fissions producing isotope i
ai is the number of atoms of isotope i
Yi is the cumulative fission yield of isotope i in mass chain
R subscripts indicate purely refractory mass chain
Typically, FR is dependent on fuel type, carrier solidification temperature, and time
which is determined by yield of the device. A mass chain that has an FR value higher
than 0.98 is referred to as refractory while lower than 0.02 is known as volatile. Values
between these two bounds are defined as mixed chains [26]. Fig. 3.5 demonstrates the
definition of FR or the fractional amount of the mass chain which is refractory. Mass chain
95 is considered purely refractory as 99.7% of the mass chain is refractory at the time of
solidification.
Because of the different elemental condensation temperatures, particles are volume or
surface distributed throughout or on the carrier material. Particle size was found to follow a














N(r) is the number of particles of radius r
Nt is the total number of particles
α0 is the natural logarithm of median radius
β is the logarithmic standard deviation
The volumetric and surface activity-size distributions also follow a lognormal distribution
through higher moments of the lognormal function which is conveniently another lognor-
mal function shown below. The surface distribution follows the same lognormal distribu-












α3 = α0 + 3β
2 or 3rd moment of the lognormal distribution
fv is the fraction of activity volumetrically distributed
These relationships [26] were used to volumetrically or surface distribute the ORIGEN
gamma inventory or determine the FR for each gamma energy bin. Monte Carlo based
SA was used to determine the sensitivities of FR. The rV,R value was also set to mimic
a location in the fallout field and corresponding gamma spectrum. This method is fully
described in section 3.3.5.
Different fractionation samples were also generated and used to calculate time and en-
ergy dependent total/first-order sensitivity indices. Freiling determined chemical fraction-
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ation is modeled with a logarithmic relationship found in Eq. 3.15.












Using the formulation in Eq. 3.15, ri,R values can be calculated for each mass chain by
setting rV,R. Values considered in this research were rV,R = 0.1, 0.2, and 0.5. The range
of values chosen was due to the short time scale. A rV,R value of 0.1 is considered highly
refractory and would be found closer to ground zero while 0.5 is considered volatile. Each
isotope constituent of mass chain i, was multiplied by the corresponding ri,R value for
mass chain i. This method yields a “fractionated” sample for a total/first-order sensitivity
indices calculation. The high temperatures during the prompt front-end time period require
use of the unfractionated sample total/first-order sensitivity indices. Although, use of the
total/first-order sensitivity indices for fractionated samples provide insight into delayed
variable sensitivities focusing field collection methods.
Importantly, the derived unfractionated sample relationships developed from this sim-
plified model accelerates the MCF calculation. Without prior relationships, the MCF vari-
able sample space is large which requires many samples to adequately cover the sample
space. Consequently, the high amount of samples does not guarantee the actual configura-
tion to be represented. Using the point-source model relationships allows the uncertainty
in the sample space to shrink which increases the likelihood of the true configuration to be
represented and sampled.
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3.3.2 Peri-Detonation Monte Carlo Filtering Acceleration Scheme – Section (i)
The acceleration scheme is developed from analysis of the point-source SA results that
include the detector response and integral counts between 1.00E-05 and 1.00E-01 seconds.
Integral counts and detector response functions created a more realistic representation of
the data. Notably, nuclear data uncertainties were not considered because each data point
would require hundreds of runs to quantify the total uncertainty in just one data point. The
acceleration scheme, while crude, highlights the effect of inputting known distributions
into a predictive algorithm. Noteworthy, yield information can be obtained from other
sources, but for the sake of this research, an acceleration scheme was not developed for
yield or blast energy information. While global sensitivity analysis methods reveal more
information on variable behavior, local methods were used for acceleration development
because of smaller computation times.
Regression analysis, related to local sensitivity methods/metrics, applied to the detector
response and integrated counts between 1.00E-05 and 1.00E-01 seconds allowed for deter-
mination of the MCF acceleration relationships. This method was completed by applying
a linear fit over all possible energy ratios (independent variable) versus the fractional mass
(dependent variable) and maximizing the resulting correlation coefficient. To complement
the regression analysis, a fractional “purity” metric was developed for each energy range
and nuclide shown in Eq. 3.16. This trend coupled with calculation of the correlation
coefficients allowed development of the MCF relationships.
SkPurity =
Ski
|SkT − Ski |
(3.16)
where:
SkPurity is the purity metric for nuclide k,
Ski is the main effect sensitivity index for nuclide k,
SkT is the total sensitivity index for nuclide k,
|SkT − Ski | is the interaction amount of nuclide k with other variables.
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The top energy ranges were chosen by eliminating energy ranges with high computational
uncertainty (> 3 MeV), energies lower than 100 keV which natural background and elec-
tronic noise affect, and energies around 511 keV which is the energy associated with
positron annihilation. Once these constraints were applied, the purity values combined
with the correlation coefficients indicated which energy ratios were the most effective in
determining rapid fuel-type estimation.
3.3.3 Peri-Detonation Front-End Time Period – Section (ii)
The importance of the Section (ii) calculation stems from the device emitting characteristic
signatures being still mostly an intact configuration. Analysis of these components fol-
lowing detonation become more challenging when particle collection is involved. Prompt
signatures originating from the fuel and other structural components are highly dependent
on the configuration due to photon/neutron leakage which can provide insight into sophisti-
cation. Later peri-detonation emissions following the disassembly can also provide insight
into sophistication.
The prompt front-end curve highlights the prompt hypothetical unboosted fission and
activation photons emitted during the Gaussian shaped power excursion. These photons
were generated using the 1-D Criticality Safety Analysis Sequences (CSAS) within the
Scale 6.2 package. Importantly, the CSAS module outputs photon/neutron leakage values
which are transported to the problem boundary and used to determine a detector response.
This module uses the XSDRNPM for cross-section weighting/collapsing and determination
of the neutron multiplication factor (keff ) in 1-D spherical coordinates. XSDRNPM is a
1-D discrete-ordinates transport code. This research employed the ENDF/B-VII.1 coupled
200 neutron and 47 gamma group cross-section library. Inputs into the CSAS module
were fuel/reflector type, mass, and density. These inputs dictate the energy output/physics
within the system inherently affecting the photon spectrum. From the CSAS output, the
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Rossi alpha and total energy output (device yield) were calculated for development of the
power curve and ORIGEN irradiation.
Rossi Alpha and Total Energy Output
Passive emission magnitudes are determined from physical properties and design specifi-
cations. To replace hydrodynamic calculations and generate a realistic emission profile, a
simplified reactor accident relationship is used along with the prompt Rossi alpha constant.
These values are calculated from the 1-D spherical transport calculation results. Further-
more, the hypothetical prompt emission curve width is held constant assuming a symmetric
- Gaussian - burnup profile while the magnitude increases or decreases according to the
Rossi alpha constant.
The Rossi alpha constant is dependent on several system properties and determines the
speed and magnitude of the reaction or energy output ultimately dictating the passively
measurable signature magnitude and profile. Beginning with the point reactor kinetics
equation for neutron density in Eq. 3.17a, the prompt Rossi alpha, αp, can be derived when


















; l ≡Mean generation time; l0 ≡ Prompt neutron lifetime; (3.17c)






















≡ αp (Prompt Rossi Alpha) (3.17f)
The above equation is expressed in terms of power due to the time dependence of neutron
density on the system mean fission cross-section [27]. The Rossi alpha value is directly
related to the sophistication or design level of the device as it ultimately dictates burnup
with the exponential rise in power. Modeling the exponential power rise offers the re-
searcher with a simplified emission profile, which affects time-dependent detection limits
and sensitivity indices.
Modeling hydrodynamic phenomena, such as pressure and density changes within the
core, are neglected. Avoiding complex hydrodynamics has multiple benefits mainly reduc-
ing computation time. Spatial density, temperature, and pressure changes inherently change
the Rossi alpha value. A symmetric constant width Gaussian burnup/emission profile is as-
sumed. The calculated Rossi alpha value determines the magnitude of the constant width
Gaussian profile. To fix the width (burn time) of the Gaussian, the time upper bound of the
power curve is set to one-microsecond (1.00E-06 seconds) giving a µ value of 5.00E-07
seconds or when the max power emission occurs. The standard deviation, σ, is calculated
to be 5.00E-08 seconds by Eq. 3.18.
µ+ 20σ = tstop




Next, the total energy output is calculated using Eq. 3.19. This equation provides the basis
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E is the total energy output
R is the core radius
l is the prompt neutron lifetime
δρ is the reactivity change or keffective−1.0
keffective
For severe reactor accidents, Eq. 3.19 stems from the pressure in the core being pro-
portional to the total energy output. The pressure gradient produced causes the assembly
to expand eventually causing the reaction to stop. This happens when rt
Rinitial
∝ δρ at
which the total energy output is found in Eq. 3.19 [28]. The prompt burnup power curve is
formulated from this simplified equation.
Integrating the Gaussian power curve yields the total energy output from Eq. 3.19. The
Gaussian is the probability density function (PDF) of the power in the system. Setting
the integral of a PDF equal to the total energy output allows for the power curve to be
formulated. This is possible because the µ and σ values were set previously. Eq. 3.20





















The cumulative distribution function (Eq. 3.20) is set to the total energy output. Estimating
the derivative, dE
dt
or power, yields the power curve desired for simulations. For illustration,
a 1 kiloton (kt) - 4.18E+12 Joules - blast equivalent is shown below in Figs. 3.6 and 3.7.
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Figure 3.6: Cumulative distribution function of energy output from 1 kt blast.
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Figure 3.7: Formulated power curve probability density function from 1 kt blast.
These power curve formulations/simplifications side-step hydrodynamic calculations offer-
ing computational speed-up and removal of potential sensitivities. Once the photons have
been generated, scaled to the power, and transported to the boundary of the problem, a
detector response function is used to generate the photon spectrum.
Detector Response
Applying detector responses to the generated photon emissions provides a realistic repre-
sentation of detection capabilities/limitations and the effects on data quality and availabil-
ity. Detector response functions were generated using the Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport
(MCNP) 6.1 code package. The LaBr3(Ce) detector response was modeled after the detec-
tor used in the experimental portion of this research. The radius and height of the modeled
detector was 3.81 centimeters (cm). No secondary components of the detection system
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were modeled. Because of the timing importance, the same integration time employed in
the experimental portion was used to realistically model the pulse collection limitations of
the detector. The inverse of integration time, pulses
second
, was taken as the upper rate limit the de-
tector was capable of handling at each time step. The decay time used was 0.016 microsec-
onds, based off Saint Gobain’s LaBr3(Ce) properties [29]. This number was increased by
a factor of 10 to incorporate pulse decay times. To incorporate baseline determination and
the pulse rise time, the number was further increased by 20 nanoseconds yielding a total
integration time of 180 nanoseconds. The 47-group photon energy structure was used for
calculating the detector response. The photon energy group structure is shown below in
Table 3.4 and an unnormalized comparison is shown in Figure 3.9.
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Table 3.4: ENDF/B-VII.1 47 group photon energy bounds used for sensitivity analysis.
Energy Bounds [MeV] Group Number Energy Bounds [MeV] Group Number
2.000E+01 - 1.400E+01 G1 1.400E+01 - 1.200E+01 G2
1.200E+01 - 1.000E+01 G3 1.000E+01 - 8.000E+00 G4
8.000E+00 - 7.500E+00 G5 7.500E+00 - 7.000E+00 G6
7.000E+00 - 6.500E+00 G7 6.500E+00 - 6.000E+00 G8
6.000E+00 - 5.500E+00 G9 5.500E+00 - 5.000E+00 G10
5.000E+00 - 4.500E+00 G11 4.500E+00 - 4.000E+00 G12
4.000E+00 - 3.500E+00 G13 3.500E+00 - 3.000E+00 G14
3.000E+00 - 2.750E+00 G15 2.750E+00 - 2.500E+00 G16
2.500E+00 - 2.350E+00 G17 2.350E+00 - 2.150E+00 G18
2.150E+00 - 2.000E+00 G19 2.000E+00 - 1.800E+00 G20
1.800E+00 - 1.660E+00 G21 1.660E+00 - 1.570E+00 G22
1.570E+00 - 1.500E+00 G23 1.500E+00 - 1.440E+00 G24
1.440E+00 - 1.330E+00 G25 1.330E+00 - 1.200E+00 G26
1.200E+00 - 1.000E+00 G27 1.000E+00 - 9.000E-01 G28
9.000E-01 - 8.000E-01 G29 8.000E-01 - 7.000E-01 G30
7.000E-01 - 6.000E-01 G31 6.000E-01 - 5.120E-01 G32
5.120E-01 - 5.100E-01 G33 5.100E-01 - 4.500E-01 G34
4.500E-01 - 4.000E-01 G35 4.000E-01 - 3.000E-01 G36
3.000E-01 - 2.600E-01 G37 2.600E-01 - 2.000E-01 G38
2.000E-01 - 1.500E-01 G39 1.500E-01 - 1.000E-01 G40
1.000E-01 - 7.500E-02 G41 7.500E-02 - 7.000E-02 G42
7.000E-02 - 6.000E-02 G43 6.000E-02 - 4.500E-02 G44
4.500E-02 - 3.000E-02 G45 3.000E-02 - 2.000E-02 G46
2.000E-02 - 1.000E-02 G47
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Fundamentally, photon detection requires the photon to interact in the detection medium
whether inorganic, organic, or a semiconductor. The detection is determined by the proper-
ties of the detection medium. Because photons are electromagnetic radiation, they readily
interact with negatively charged electrons. For photons, high-Z material increases the prob-
ability for interaction due to the increased electron density. Detection is possible because
the photon transfers energy to an electron. The electron ionization produces more electrons
from atomic collisions which is detectable by charge collection [30]. The relevant pho-
ton interactions to detection are: photoelectric absorption, Compton scattering, and pair
production. Photoelectric absorption is the most desired as all of the photon’s energy is de-
posited into the detector leading to distinct full energy peaks. Compton scattering within the
detection medium produces less distinct peaks as energy is only partially deposited. The
photoelectric absorption, Compton scatter, and pair production photon interaction cross
sections are found in Fig. 3.8 for the LaBr3(Ce) detector.
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Figure 3.8: LaBr3(Ce) photon interaction cross sections for photoelectric absorption,
Compton scattering, and pair production. Generated from National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) photon cross-section database (XCOM) [31].
MCNP mimics detection physics by Monte Carlo random number sampling to statis-
tically buildup/converge a reaction rate or pulse height within the detector volume. The
total detector response is found below in Eq. 3.21 [23]. The MCNP pulse height tally
provides a physical analog to pulses created in a detector volume through random number
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sampling. Once the energies have been discretized to the 47-group structure, the total en-
ergy deposition in the detector volume can be determined by aggregating all tracks within
the volume of a generated particle. Simply, the pulse height tally creates an energy distri-
bution of pulses occurring within the detector volume. Particles were simulated across each
energy range within the 47-group structure impinging on the detector volume. Each gen-
erated source particle energy range creates a distribution of pulses in other energy ranges






σd(~r, E)φ(~r, E)dEdV (3.21)
where:
R is the total detector response
φ is the scalar flux,
σd is the desired detector response function
Figure 3.9 shows a raw photon spectrum and a photon spectrum with an applied detec-
tor response function at 1.00E-06 seconds following detonation. This time is dominated
by photons originating from early-time fission products. Applying detector response func-
tions to SA analyses are meant to highlight the effect on the sensitivity indices or variable
importance and additionally providing a more realistic treatment of phenomena generating
more relevant sensitivity indices.
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Figure 3.9: Comparison of photon spectra with and without application of detector response
function.
Towards the end of the Gaussian emission curve, fission product photon emission dom-
inates the prompt photons marking the start of prompt back-end time period. Noteworthy,
delayed neutrons are present in the nuclear cloud creating secondary photon reactions that
contribute to the total photon signal in the back-end period or Sections (iii) - (v).
3.3.4 Peri-Detonation Back-End Time Period Photon Production – Section (iii)
Completion of the CSAS module for front-end photon emission signals the back-end se-
quences to begin. ORIGEN point source neutron and photon spectra are generated and
stored for injection into a 1-D volumetric source problem. Prior to the volumetric calcu-
lation, a system of ordinary differential equations (ODE) are solved to produce material
compositions/densities, temperatures, and nuclear cloud dimensions which serves as the
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1-D geometry and material specifications.
The 1-D transport calculation provides the basis input settings for back-end photon pro-
duction. These calculated constants and distributions are fed into the ORIGEN point source
model which yield photon and neutron sources from the calculated time-dependent nuclide
concentrations. Specifically, the power curve/distribution, fuels, and masses obtained from
the CSAS 1-D model output were used in the ORIGEN depletion sequence outputting time
and energy dependent nuclide inventories, photon and neutron spectra. These spectra are
highly important for secondary reactions, attenuation, and propagation through the nuclear
cloud which ultimately affects detectability of nuclear cloud signatures.
ORIGEN determines time dependent nuclide concentrations with the associated radi-
ation source terms which determines emission detectability. The time rate of change of a









fikσkNk − (λi + φ̄σi)Ni, (i=1,...,m),
where:
Ni = atom density of nuclide, i,
λi = disintegration constant of nuclide, i,
σi = spectrum-averaged neutron absorption cross section of nuclide, i,
φ̄ = space and energy averaged neutron flux,
lij = decay branching fractions for nuclide, i, from other nuclides, j,
fik = branching fractions for neutron absorption by other nuclides, k, that form species i.
(3.22)
The time dependent nuclide concentrations yield the desired emissions for use in the 1-D
volumetric calculation. Source magnitudes generated from the ORIGEN calculation are
inserted into the 1-D volumetric source problem.
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3.3.5 Peri-Detonation Nuclear Cloud Rise – Sections (iv-v)
The time-dependent neutron and photon spectra generated from Section (iii) are stored and
injected into a CSAS volumetric source problem. For time-dependent dimensions, tem-
peratures, and material specifications used in the volumetric source problem, a simplified
DELFIC model was developed for determination of urban environment mass entrainment
and radial dimension using equations in Section 3.3.5 up to 1 minute after detonation. Mod-
eling urban debris uptake in a nuclear detonation is necessary because of photon attenuation
and subsequent activation resulting from the delayed neutrons present in the nuclear cloud;
all of which, contribute and create noise in the total photon signal.
Peri-Detonation Nuclear Cloud Rise and Mass Entrainment [32]
The Defense Land Fallout Interpretive Code (DELFIC) was developed by several contrib-
utors under the Department of Defense. This code is used for research and prediction of
local fallout from a nuclear detonation commencing once the fireball pressure equals the
atmospheric pressure. The nuclear cloud is treated as a bubble of hot air entrained with wa-
ter and ground material. For the purposes of this research, the neutron and gamma source
is distributed uniformly through the nuclear cloud. Debris masses, densities, temperatures,
and cloud dimensions are found using the following set of ordinary differential equations































































DELFIC treats nuclear cloud rise as an entraining buoyant hot mass of air that is inter-
mixed with soil particles. The momentum balance equation is meant to provide the cloud’s
center rate of rise through calculation of its acceleration [33]. After the initial soil, water,
and air masses entrained in the cloud are determined, their respective mass mixing ratio
equations are solved, ultimately yielding time-dependent densities for the 1-D volumetric
source problem. The time-dependent soil, water, and air masses affect the buoyancy, trajec-
tory, and temperature of the cloud. The temperature equation is obtained from an enthalpy
balance because entrainment is a constant pressure process. The time-dependent tempera-
ture provides a switch for using the dry and wet equations and is important in fractionation
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Dry equations are used prior to water saturation which means no water mass is lost to con-
densation. Conversely, the wet equations are used once the water has saturated and is lost
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to condensation. Further explanation of constants, empirical equations, and initial condi-
tions can be found in the DELFIC fundamentals manual or Refs. [32] and [33]. Definitions
are found at the end of this section. Solving the above system of ODEs yields material
compositions, temperatures, densities, and dimensions of the nuclear cloud. Notably, the
material density is calculated from the time-dependent soil/water/air mixing ratios and the
nuclear cloud total mass resulting from the mass entrainment equations.
51
Definitions









T ∗ = Tq(x);
T ∗e = Tqe(x);
β′ =
1 + x
















































Specific heat of soil at constant pressure;
µ = max
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L = 2.5E + 06/2.83E + 06
Joules
kg






The system of ODEs is solved for temperature, cloud dimensions, material composi-
tions, and cloud density between 3 and 60 seconds. The generated photon source is then
inserted into a 1-D transport code with the calculated DELFIC factors. Each of these fac-
52
tors affect propagation/absorption of passively measurable signatures within the nuclear
cloud. The behavior within the cloud determines what is available for detection placing
limitations on conclusions.
Once the 1-D volumetric calculation is run using DELFIC calculated values, the energy-
and time-dependent photon fluxes are gathered at the boundary. These fluxes are scaled
down to the detector geometry and a detector response function, discussed earlier, is ap-
plied.
The randomly generated spectra from the prompt front-end and back-end time period
are then compared to the reference Fat Man and Little Boy spectra. The process is then
repeated N times and the resulting “passed” configurations are post-processed which yield
configuration distributions (i.e. masses, fuels, height-of-burst, etc.) with associated uncer-
tainties.
3.4 Peri-Detonation Sensitivity/Uncertainty Analysis Results
Traditional post-detonation nuclear forensic science contains many limiting factors that
affect timely decisions. The relevance of the science contributing to actionable nuclear
information at early-times is a debated issue [12]. Computational and experimental peri-
detonation analyses of passively measurable signatures may contribute to early-time nu-
clear information following a domestic nuclear detonation.
The complexity of peri-detonation nuclear forensics requires SA to sort through noisy
data which can obscure subtle characteristics. Local, global variance reduction, and MCF
methods were combined to illustrate application versatility and accuracy/precision. A com-
bination of local and global sensitivity methods were completed on an ORIGEN generated
point-source model for MCF acceleration.
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3.4.1 Peri-Detonation Uncertainty Analysis Results
Computational modeling errors fundamentally display how much the answer fluctuates. In
this case, the uncertainty causes fluctuations in the photon emissions which are used for
inferring characteristics of the detonation. The error magnitude is inversely proportional
to conclusion confidence; i.e., high error produces low confidence. The photon emission
uncertainty considered in this research was associated with nuclear data. MCF acceler-
ation/filtering schemes applied the quantified uncertainty to the reference cases photon
emissions. Logically, all MCF runs would contain an uncertainty in the photon emissions
requiring a multitude of calculations. To avoid this requirement, detailed uncertainty cal-
culations were performed on the two reference cases. These uncertainties were applied to
each MCF run for acceleration/filtering results. The nuclear data uncertainty in conjunction
with detector limitations places bounds on early-time conclusions.






















Figure 3.10: Yield distribution from cross-section uncertainties.
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Figure 3.11: Fat Man design derivative time-dependent photon emission absolute uncer-
tainty fraction between 0.0 and 60.0 seconds.
The uncertainty associated with the power calculation is shown in Fig. 3.10 and in-
cludes cross-sections, fission product yields, and decay uncertainty. Figure 3.11 shows the
time-dependent photon emission uncertainty for the Fat Man reference spectrum including
compounded uncertainty from the power curve calculation. Higher energy emissions con-
tain large uncertainties, some equaling 100% at later times. Lower absolute uncertainties
lie under approximately 6 MeV. The reference uncertainty affects conclusions based on
the results from the MCF calculation and acceleration scheme. Lower overall error would
reduce the amount of matched cases increasing the predictive power.
Uncertainty analysis was also used in determining an effective distance of photon detec-
tion. The generalized peri-detonation time period encompasses all phenomena and emis-
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sions up to 60 seconds following detonation. The distance away from the blast are very
important because of detectability which dictates information availability and quality. Un-
certainty increases as the counting statistics decrease which inherently reduces conclusion
confidence. Effective distance calculations were run for the Fat Man and Little Boy de-
vice derivatives from approximately 400 meters to 8050 meters (0.25-5.0 miles) with the
LaBr3(Ce) detector response function. The uncertainty arising from the nuclear data and
integrated counts were used as a metric for determining the maximum distance allowed
for passive emission detection. Effective distance should be maximized because of fireball
dynamics which may impact detection equipment and the associated data.
The uncertainty (1σ) associated with the integrated counts over 60 seconds clearly show
limits on detectability. Higher energy bins over 10 MeV contain over 100% error at the
onset of calculation or the 400 meter mark. Fortunately, none of the energy bins used for
MCF acceleration and fractional mass indicators are above this energy. The error remains
negligible in the lower energy bins but noticeably begins to increase around 1200 meters.
Interestingly, the uncertainty spikes to over 100% in every energy bin except the 0.01-0.02
MeV range at 3300 meters. The 0.01-0.02 MeV range uncertainty climbs to 90% at 4600
meters. Figures 3.12 and 3.13 show the uncertainty behavior with distance for the 0.01-0.02
and 1.0-1.2 MeV energy ranges, respectively.
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Figure 3.12: Fractional uncertainty behavior for the 0.01-0.02 MeV energy range.
























Figure 3.13: Fractional uncertainty behavior for the 1.0-1.2 MeV energy range.
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The error trend associated with distance are similar between the two energy ranges. How-
ever, the error rises significantly faster with the 1.0-1.2 MeV energy range which is mainly
attributed to the counting statistics as the data uncertainty ranges between 2 to 11% for the
1.0-1.2 MeV energy bin. Notably, the data uncertainty for the 0.01-0.02 MeV energy bin
ranges between 3 to 8%.










































Figure 3.14: Fat Man design derivative heat map of integral detection uncertainty associ-
ated with distance from ground zero.
Figure 3.14 shows the detection uncertainty associated with distance away from ground
zero for a Fat Man design derivative. The goal of passive measurement is to gain informa-
tion about the device and circumstances surrounding the detonation. The distance used
for the MCF algorithm was 400 meters which in reality would be destroyed shortly after
detonation. In order for the detector system to convey information about the device, it
must survive long enough to relay the pertinent data. Uncertainty associated with the data
is important for drawing conclusions on the device. In the case of this research, nuclear
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data uncertainty is compounded with uncertainty from the integral counts between 0 and
60 seconds.
The quoted uncertainties, 50%, 25%, and 5%, demonstrate the effect of distance on de-
tectability and requiring a threshold uncertainty level which is ultimately up to the policy
maker. Passive measurement uncertainty from the Fat Man design derivative reached an
ultimate cut-off at 3300 meters. The energies between 1 and 6 MeV showed effective dis-
tances (with previous uncertainty levels) of 1900(50%), 1700(25%), and 1400(5%) meters
while under 1.0 MeV gives distances of 1900(50%), 1900(25%), and 1700(5%) meters.
For comparison, a Little Boy design derivative was modeled with the same energy output
(yield) as the Fat Man derivative which produced different results.
Because the bare assembly did not contain a reflector, more of the photon emission leak
out and are transported to the detector. This higher leakage is shown by energies below 1
MeV producing larger effective distances of 2200(50%), 1900(25%), and 1700(5%) meters
when compared to the Fat Man derivative. The energies between 1 and 6 MeV produced
effective distances of 1900(50%), 1900(25%), and 1700(5%) meters. Clearly, the shield-
ing of photons by structural components effects the optimum distance of detection by the
increase in the Little Boy derivative effective distance. The uncertainty of the Little Boy
derivative is shown below in Fig. 3.15 out to 4000 meters.
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Figure 3.15: Little Boy design derivative heat map of detection uncertainty associated with
distance from ground zero.
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Figure 3.16: Uncertainty fractional difference between Fat Man and Little Boy design
derivatives heat map associated with distance from ground zero.
The two design derivatives produce different effective distance results. These differ-
ences are shown in Fig. 3.16. The intensity scale is the fractional difference between the
two device derivatives which can be attributed to the slight differences in energy output
and reflection/shielding. Interestingly, there are high fractional differences between 6 and
12 MeV at short distances. Between 1500 and 3000 meters the fractional difference in-
creases spanning from approximately 3 to 7 MeV. Starting at approximately 5 MeV, there
is a band of low fractional difference that resembles a sigmoidal function extending out
between 2000 and 2500 meters. Because the design is unknown during an event, effective
distances must be conservative. This conservative requirement demands using the Fat Man
design derivative lesser effective distances.
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Figure 3.17: Fat Man design derivative yield and distance relationship with error set at
10%.
Figure 3.17 shows the device yield relationship to effective distance of detectability.
The effective distance was determined by setting the aggregate error from the counts and
cross-sections to 10%. To provide a conservative estimate of effective distance, the max
yield for each distance estimate (horizontal lines) was fitted with a logarithm function
shown below in Equation 3.27.
D = 227.30 ln(3.34W ) (3.27)
where:
D is the effective distance of detectability for 10% error,
W is the device yield in kt.
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The conservative fit will lower the effective distances for lower yields which is a safe as-
sumption considering the grouping of the distances. Grouping or setting the data to 10%
caused the horizontal distances to be discretized into the trend shown in Fig. 3.17. The
developed effective distance formula aids placement of a scintillation detection system at a
prescribed device yield.
3.4.2 Point-Source Model Sensitivity Analysis Results
Variance decomposition methods, developed by Sobol, highlighted input variable behavior
within the complex system well. Relationships shown in this section were used to acceler-
ate MCF in the spatial model. To understand the behavior of the input variables on energy
and time-dependent photon spectra, first-order and total sensitivity indices were examined
with raw rates (photons
second
) in the photon energy bin over 60 seconds.
Unfractionated Sample Sensitivity Analysis Results
An unfractionated sample represents all photons generated from ORIGEN depletion calcu-
lation. This portion of the SA is used for MCF acceleration and does not include fission or
activation photons. Consequently, the relevant times in this SA are following the Gaussian
burnup (1.0E-06 seconds) and before the initialization time of nuclear cloud rise (approx-
imately 3.0 seconds). Because of these constraints, the time period examined is between
1.0E-05 and 1.0E-01 seconds.
For brevity, all first-order and total sensitivity indices raw values for the variables: neu-
tron spectrum (shape), flux (magnitude), and fuel-type (238U, 235U, 233U, 239Pu) are not
shown. The number of variables, energy groups (47), and time steps prohibit displaying
within reason. Instead, the main effect and total sensitivity indices are averaged, including
2σ bounds, over each photon energy bin.
Figure 3.18 shows the mean Si indices for the flux, spectrum, 238U, and 235U for the
unfractionated sample with no applied detector response. Overwhelmingly, the flux has
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the highest importance towards each photon energy bin. The small 2σ standard deviation
indicates little fluctuation in the Si main effect index across photon energy bins. Spectrum
shape is the next highest importance but is roughly 2 orders of magnitude less than the
flux Si value. Other aforementioned variables Si values are extremely small hence not
contributing to the output variance and therefore not displayed.


























Figure 3.18: Unfractionated Si values averaged over photon energy bins for flux, spectrum,
238U, and 235U with flux variable being the highest contributor to photon production.
For clarity, the mean value of the flux Si value is approximately 0.2 across time. This value
indicates knowing the true flux value would only explain roughly 20% of the variance in
each of the photon energy bin emissions. The low value of correlation is attributed to
nonlinearities or interactions between the other input variables. Further insight is gained
through examining the total sensitivity indices, ST .
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Figure 3.19: Unfractionated ST values averaged over photon energy bins for flux, spectrum,
238U, and 235U with 235U having the highest value.
Figure 3.19 shows the mean total sensitivity indices, ST , for the same input variables. In-
terestingly, 235U increases approximately 5 orders of magnitude from its Si value. This
dramatic increase is attributed to heavy interactions between the other input variables or
strong nonlinear relationships to photon emission. Noteworthy, 233U and 239Pu ST val-
ues increased to approximately 1.0. Flux and spectrum values increased approximately 2
and 1000 times, respectively. Again, these increases are attributed to interactions between
the input variables and nonlinearities. These indices provide clues to the underlying data
structure and relationships.
There are 47 photon energy groups and many time steps for which relationships can be
derived. For concision, energy bins and times are arbitrarily chosen for method demon-
stration. From the previous flux Si and ST values some amount of linear correlation exists
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between the flux and photon rates. The difference between the Si and ST values indicate
there are possible interactions and nonlinearities associated. For example, Figure 3.20 il-
lustrates the nonlinearity relationship to the photon rate in the 1.0-1.2 MeV photon bin at
1.0 second following detonation.
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Figure 3.20: Unfractionated flux association with 1.0-1.2 MeV photon energy bin rate at
1.0 second.
Because the Si values for the flux are the highest - relative - for all variables, correlation to
the photon rates is more likely. A power law relationship to the photon rate in the 1.0-1.2
MeV was found between the flux. This flux relationship presents more error to the predic-
tion value obtained from the formula because of the R2 value. The higher error can also
be seen in the low Si values for the flux. Nevertheless, predictions using the formulas in
Fig. 3.20 still lower the distribution of flux values given to the MCF method. Because the
Si values for the spectrum, Ēneutron, are quite low, the relationship to the photon rate is
nonexistent as shown in Fig. 3.21. Notably, these relationships were developed from ran-
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dom unstratified Monte Carlo sampling and do not incorporate detector response functions.
This type of sampling produces nonphysical configurations and outputs.




















Figure 3.21: Unfractionated spectrum association with 1.0-1.2 MeV photon energy bin rate
at 1.0 second.
For the purposes of MCF acceleration, the total energy output (yield) and a rough in-
dication of fuel-type is important. Figure 3.22 shows yield scales almost linearly to the
photon rate in the 1.0-1.2 MeV photon bin. Because activation and attenuation information
are not present, mass information is difficult to deduce shown in Fig. 3.23.
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Figure 3.22: Unfractionated yield association with 1.0-1.2 MeV photon energy bin rate at
1.0 second.
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Figure 3.23: Unfractionated 238U mass association with 1.0-1.2 MeV photon energy bin
rate at 1.0 second.
Although the 238U mass estimates appear scattered, there is a clear outer photon rate and
mass boundary. This outer boundary can further be fit to reveal the upper amount of 238U
mass. Because these relationships do not consider detector response, the relationships can-
not be used for the MCF acceleration scheme. Also, the Monte Carlo sampling used for
these relationships was unstratified meaning that some nonphysical samples were gener-
ated. This unstratified sampling also prohibited the use of relationships in this section for
MCF acceleration. Relationships developed and used are shown in Sec. 3.4.3.
Fractionated Samples Sensitivity Analysis Results
Chemical fractionation occurs at approximately the carrier material solidification temper-
ature. Because the sample is not fractionated before this point, the time period examined
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is between 3.0-60.0 seconds. Fractionation levels of 0.1 and 0.5 were examined to show
refractory and volatile behavior. Because of the brief time period each sample, 0.1 and
0.5, will have a presence in the nuclear cloud. Similarly, all first-order and total sensitiv-
ity indices raw values for the variables: neutron spectrum (shape), flux (magnitude), and
fuel-type (238U, 235U, 233U, 239Pu) are not shown.

























Figure 3.24: Fractionated - 0.1 - Si values averaged over photon energy bins for flux, spec-
trum, 238U, and 235U with flux variable being the highest contributor to photon production.
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Figure 3.25: Fractionated - 0.1 - ST values averaged over photon energy bins for flux,
spectrum, 238U, and 235U with 235U variable with the highest ST index value.
Figs. 3.24 and 3.25 represent the average Si and ST over energy with upper and lower
bounds. 235U sensitivity indices change drastically between main and total effects. This
change is indicative of heavy interaction (ST value over 1) between the input variables and
nonlinearities in the relationship. Interestingly, 238U’s sensitivity indices remain negligible,
meaning removing 238U from the model would not affect the energy photon emission rate.
The flux and spectrum indices move upwards but remain under 1 indicating nonlinearities
and interactions. Previous flux plots, Fig. 3.20, have confirmed nonlinearities by the found
power law relationships. The spectrum relationship is mostly attributed to interactions with
other variables because of the similar Si and ST values and previous plots (Fig. 3.21). The
flux yields the highest importance for both the 0.1 and unfractionated samples.
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Figure 3.26: Fractionated - 0.5 - Si values averaged over photon energy bins for flux, spec-
trum, 238U, and 235U with flux variable being the highest contributor to photon production.
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Figure 3.27: Fractionated - 0.5 - ST values averaged over photon energy bins for flux,
spectrum, 238U, and 235U with 235U variable with the highest ST index value.
Similarly, Figs. 3.26 and 3.27 show the same behavior over the given time period. The
flux maintains the highest main effect to the rate within the energy bin while 238U maintains
the lowest. Interestingly, the spectrum variable ST bounds hide the flux variable. Because
of these higher ST values shown in Figs. 3.27 and 3.25, model reduction by setting these
values to zero is not possible. This trend is also present with the 233U and 239Pu variables,
which are absent from the Figures for their overlap of 235U values. Alternatively, 238U
can be set to zero without affecting the energy bin photon emission rate. Seemingly, the
behavior across each sample (unfractionated, 0.1, and 0.5) is similar.
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3.4.3 Spatial Model Monte Carlo Filtering Results
Reference cases were generated to mimic Little Boy and Fat Man devices from known
open source mass estimates with randomly selected densities. MCF techniques typically
require sampling of the entirety of the known input space. In this case, the sample space
encompasses many configurations with varying fuel types, reflectors, and densities. To
narrow down the MCF input space, point-source model SA results/relationships are used
to accelerate the search substantially reducing computation time.
Unaccelerated Monte Carlo Filtering Results
For demonstration, the MCF algorithm was run, without any acceleration scheme or un-
certainty, against the Fat Man design derivative reference spectrum using 5000 randomly
generated samples. Only the first check results are shown which were checked against the
reference spectrum shape. Pass fractions above 0.40 were accepted as possible configura-
tions.
Out of the 5000 random simulations, 80 matched the spectrum shape with the above
constraints or 1.6%. Each of the possible fuel types, 235U, 233U, 239Pu, were matched with
varying masses and reflectors. The 80 matched samples contained a multitude of yields
shown in Fig. 3.28.
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Figure 3.28: Yield distribution of unaccelerated Monte Carlo Filtering results from 80
matched samples.
The yield distribution contained a range of yields from 1.0E-03 to 3.1E+03 kilotons. Inter-
estingly, most of the yields occur under 1.0E+03 kilotons. Although the yield distribution
can narrow the scope and contribute to early-time information, the goal of matching spec-
trum shape is to provide clues regarding fuel, structural components, density, and mass.
Examining macro level behavior can also become important. For example, the fissile or
primary fuel mass distribution is shown in Fig. 3.29 while the reflector mass is shown in
Fig 3.30.
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Figure 3.29: Fissile fuel mass distribution of unaccelerated Monte Carlo Filtering results
from 80 matched samples.
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Figure 3.30: Reflector mass distribution of unaccelerated Monte Carlo Filtering results
from 80 matched samples.
Matched fissile and reflector masses were widely distributed in the above plots. The fis-
sile mass ranged from 3.2E+00 to 2.0E+01 kilograms while the reflector mass ranged from
2.4E+01 to 2.1E+02 kilograms. In fact, the weighted average of the fissile mass distribution
equates to 1.2E+01 kilograms. The weighted average of the reflector mass was calculated
to be 9.5E+01 kilograms. The “true” values are 6.2E+00 and 1.0E+02 kilograms for the
fissile and reflector masses, respectively. These calculated masses equate to 100% and 5%
differences for the fissile and reflector masses. Although the distributions seem uninforma-
tive, probability distributions can easily be derived and further refined through other MCF
runs.
Interestingly, approximately 73% of the matched cases were 239Pu fissile fuel and 52%
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matched as 238U reflector. The mass results were less reliable for the fissile fuel yet the
type of fuel matched 73% of the time. Conversely, the reflector weighted mass was within
5% of the “true” value while the type was only matched 52% of the time. Noteworthy, a
Tungsten reflector matched 46% of the samples.
The whole input space was sampled without an acceleration scheme or nuclear data
uncertainty. Without the acceleration scheme, reflector mass was matched to within 5%
and fissile fuel type was matched 73% of the time. Applying the acceleration scheme
shrinks the possible input distributions placing the samples generated in closer proximity
to the “true” configuration.
Monte Carlo Filtering Acceleration Results
Previous relationships derived in Section 3.4.2 cannot be used for acceleration because of
the absence of the detector response function and unstratified sampling which generates
nonphysical configurations. The results presented in this section have applied detector
response functions using stratified sampling. Because of the short time line, results are ob-
tained from an unfractionated sample encompassing the aggregate fission product photon
emission. The time period examined for the acceleration was between 1.00E-05 and 1.00E-
01 seconds or the onset of the back-end time period discussed previously. This time period
was chosen to highlight fission product photon emission relationships minimizing nuclear
cloud rise effects/distortions. SA indices, Si and ST , were not determined for each possible
ratio; therefore, sensitivities were determined by regression analysis and maximizing the
each energy groups “purity” metric. These sensitivities provided the metrics for relation-
ship development by maximizing the correlation coefficient between fractional mass and
energy ratios and “purity” values.
Applying a detector response function to the photon emission data drastically changes
the relationships shown in Sec. 3.4.2. This change is attributed to the limitations of the
detector affecting the amount of data available for inference. Regardless, any informa-
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tion obtained is beneficial to accelerate the MCF algorithm. The relationships shown in
Figs. 3.31-3.34 were developed using the integral count sensitivities between 1.00E-05
and 1.00E-01 seconds including the detector response function which allowed calculation
of a purity metric. Regression analysis was also used in determining the relationships by
maximizing the correlation coefficients of each possible ratio. Energy group boundaries
can be found in Table 3.4. Figures 3.31-3.34 show the fissile/fissionable fuel fractional
mass predictive relationships. The formulas resulting from the fits were used for the MCF
acceleration. All the associated purity metrics show highly interactive denominator values
while numerator values indicated lower interactions. The energy range purity values used
in the MCF acceleration fits found in Figs. 3.31-3.34 are shown below in Tables 3.5-3.8.
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Table 3.5: 233U sensitivity “purity” calculated from Si and ST values.
Energy Range [MeV] Purity
9.000E-01 - 8.000E-01 0.0102
7.000E-01 - 6.000E-01 0.001386




























Figure 3.31: 233U fractional mass from the G29−−0.80−0.90MeV
G31−−0.60−0.70MeV ratio with associated predic-
tion bounds.
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Table 3.6: 235U sensitivity “purity” calculated from Si and ST values.
Energy Range [MeV] Purity
2.000E+00 - 1.800E+00 0.002081063
1.800E+00 - 1.660E+00 0.0003886




























Figure 3.32: 235U fractional mass from the G20−−1.80−2.0MeV
G21−−1.66−1.80MeV ratio with associated predic-
tion bounds.
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Table 3.7: 238U sensitivity “purity” calculated from Si and ST values.
Energy Range [MeV] Purity
2.500E+00 - 2.350E+00 28.7353
2.150E+00 - 2.000E+00 0.7875




























Figure 3.33: 238U fractional mass from the G17−−2.35−2.50MeV
G19−−2.00−2.15MeV ratio with associated predic-
tion bounds.
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Table 3.8: 239Pu sensitivity “purity” calculated from Si and ST values.
Energy Range [MeV] Purity
3.000E+00 - 2.750E+00 0.0912
1.660E+00 - 1.570E+00 0.000354





























Figure 3.34: 239Pu fractional mass from the G15−−2.75−3.00MeV
G22−−1.57−1.66MeV ratio with associated predic-
tion bounds.
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The patterns shown in Figs. 3.31-3.34 are a result of the stratified sampling employed.
Stratified sampling was used to cover the entirety of the input space with proportionately
varying masses and flux values. Statistically including the predictive bounds in the above
figures allows a fuel fractional mass distribution to be obtained with no prior knowledge of
the flux. Simply, the uncertainty in the flux requires an upper and lower bounded function.
Also, values of zero fractional mass were omitted from the fits. Removal was due to the
well behaved trend of zero values - no interference with bounds or average values. Table
3.9 shows the predicted values for the two reference cases.
Table 3.9: Monte Carlo Filtering acceleration fractional mass results for Fat Man (FM) and
Little Boy (LB) reference cases.
Nuclide - Reference Case [Ratio] Lower Limit Average Upper Limit
233U - FM [G29/G31] -0.0744 -0.0536 -0.0257
233U - LB [G29/G31] -0.2946 -0.1747 -0.07246
235U - FM [G20/G21] 0.0307 0.0475 0.0657
235U - LB [G20/G21] 0.6141 0.7736 0.8372
238U - FM [G17/G19] -0.0173 -0.0138 0.1065
238U - LB [G17/G19] 0.0257 0.0577 0.1887
239Pu - FM [G15/G22] -0.0744 -0.0536 -0.0257
239Pu - LB [G15/G22] -0.0496 -0.0324 -0.0149
Logically, unanimous negative values indicate absence of that fuel type. The negative val-
ues stem from removal of the zero values from the fitting function. The fractional mass is
a bounded function between zero and one, but the function used for fitting is not bounded
between these limits. Including zeros would require a sigmoidal fitting function which in-
creases uncertainty in the fit. Nevertheless, zero values are possible for the above fits but
are omitted because there is no overlap with the main fitting function. If overlap occurred,
fitting bounds would increase and possibly include values between zero and one, irrespec-
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tive of the fit. Any values above or below these limits lie outside the parameter space.
Results in Table 3.9 are used to accelerate the MCF algorithm.
Interpretation of the above results requires some prior knowledge of the methods and
physics. The ORIGEN module used for the acceleration scheme irradiates a point-source of
fuel or fuel mixture. During this time period, fission product photon emission contributes
to the signal in these energy bins. These fission products originate from fission events or
mass to energy conversions. Because ORIGEN irradiates the fuel(s) equally (in this case),
the fractional mass can be thought of as fractional fissions or the isotope most contributing
to the fission product inventory/photon emissions.
Accelerated Monte Carlo Filtering Results
Acceleration results allowed for input space reduction to expedite the MCF algorithm. A
stratified sampling technique was used to sample from different fuel, reflector, and densities
for complete coverage. The grading scheme described in Sec. 3.2 was used on all samples.
At the onset of the MCF algorithm, smaller sample sizes were sampled to further narrow
down the possible configurations.
The Fat Man like configuration contained 6.2 kilograms of pure 239Pu and 100.0 kilo-
grams of NatU. Running the abbreviated sampling space with loosened scoring require-
ments yielded matches for WGPu, pure 239Pu, and FGPu all with NatU reflectors. The
algorithm was then run on the specific configurations with tightened scoring and more
samples. Results are shown in Table 3.10. WGPu, pure 239Pu, and FGPu results have been
combined for all calculated estimates.
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Table 3.10: Monte Carlo Filtering algorithm results for Fat Man configuration. Weighted
and non-weighted estimates of fuel and reflector mass, yield, height-of-burst, and density.
239Pu/NatU 239Pu/NatU (HOB Weighted)
Fuel Mass [kg] 6.84 ± 1.17 6.84 ± 1.18
Reflector Mass [kg] 112.66 ± 24.23 112.68 ± 24.23
Yield [kt] 15.37 ± 0.93 15.37 ± 0.93
HOB [cm] 10226.72 ± 206.92 10226.57 ± 207.06
Density [ g
cm3
] 31.60 ± 3.59 31.60 ± 3.59
The weighted and non-weighted averaged estimates shown in Table 3.10 encompass the
“true” values of the reference case. The height-of-burst (HOB)/cloud rise module (CRM)
calculation uses the same scoring system but requires tedious calculation involving a sys-
tem of ODE equations. Peri-detonation HOB/CRM calculations were run between 3.0 and
60.0 seconds. Because of the computational intensity of these calculations, the CRM calcu-
lation commences after the initial burn period has been scored and passed. The CRM/HOB
calculation uses the same scoring system, the scores of the calculation serve as weights to
the non-weighted averaged values. With unlimited resources, many different configuration
combinations would earn a passing score but the HOB calculation would further eliminate
the erroneously matched configurations. Essentially, the CRM/HOB calculation provides
a secondary check to the matched configurations and increases accuracy. The CRM/HOB
weighting/filtering scheme did not change the matched values because of the front-end time
period scoring accuracy. Optimistically, the CRM/HOB weighting scheme and data could
be used if prompt measurements were not available.
Table 3.11 shows the Little Boy configuration results. The Little Boy configuration did
not contain a reflector. Yield and HOB results are spread over a large area and contain
significant error. The high error is attributed to the bare fuel with no reflector. More of the
photon emissions are escaping the assembly which immediately floods the detector even at
86
small power levels. Conversely, the fuel mass matched closer to the true mass and addition
of the HOB weighting scheme decreased the associated error.
Table 3.11: Monte Carlo Filtering algorithm results for Little Boy configuration. Weighted
and non-weighted estimates of fuel and reflector mass, yield, and height-of-burst.
235U/Air 235U/Air (HOB Weighted)
Fuel Mass [kg] 45.06 ± 4.72 44.87 ± 5.18
Reflector Mass [kg] N/A N/A
Yield [kt] 104.86 ± 114.52 109.82 ± 118.42
HOB [cm] 18139.58 ± 5359.15 18258.86 ± 5843.24
At first glance, the results presented in Table 3.11 are less reliable and provide little infor-
mation. Using the score obtained during the CRM period, the results can be filtered down
by only accepting the results with passing grades. The results are then closer to the true
values shown in Table 3.12. Applying the secondary CRM filter emphasizes the ability to
use scores from 2 time periods in order to narrow conclusions. If prompt or front-end data
is not available, the back-end CRM period can be used to deduce device characteristics.
Table 3.12: Monte Carlo Filtering algorithm results for Little Boy configuration following
secondary cloud rise module scoring requirement. Weighted and non-weighted estimates
of fuel and reflector mass, yield, and height-of-burst.
235U/Air 235U/Air (HOB Weighted)
Fuel Mass [kg] 39.07 ± 1.51 39.08 ± 1.52
Reflector Mass [kg] N/A N/A
Yield [kt] 11.71 ± 1.68 11.79 ± 1.66
HOB [cm] 12429.16 ± 612.46 12457.34 ± 602.18
The MCF algorithm matched Fat Man and Little Boy derivative designs with different
confidence levels. Further investigation of the Little Boy design derivative CRM scores in-
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creased confidence levels by only accepting “passing” scores (> 90%). The less confident
initial results of the Little Boy design derivative are subtly informative. The bare assembly
allowed more emissions to escape which saturated the “detection system.” In fact, the time
steps used for the MCF algorithm were less granular, mimicking a lower quality detec-
tion system, which inherently produced less accurate results. The subsequent signatures
emanating from the CRM back-end period allowed the results to be filtered, increasing
accuracy. The increase in accuracy from the back-end period reveals that early-time distin-
guishable signatures exist during nuclear cloud rise. Also, the Fat Man derivative design
MCF results were more accurate with the less granular time steps. The lack of granularity
and high accuracy indicate the possible use of a less sophisticated detection system.
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CHAPTER 4
PERI-DETONATION EXPERIMENTAL TECHNICAL APPROACH AND
RESULTS
Detector technology is a critical factor when considering peri-detonation photon emission
due to the short emission time scales and intensities. Detector limitations ultimately con-
strain the amount of information available at early times. Determining and displaying these
limitations allows the researcher to choose the best detection system for the given condi-
tions maximizing the amount of information available for policy maker consideration.
4.1 Relevant Detection Equipment and Data Acquisition
There are many different detector types available for photon detection including inor-
ganic/organic scintillators and semiconductors. For this research, EJ-309 and LaBr3(Ce)
scintillation and High Purity Germanium (HPGe) semiconductor detectors are examined.
The associated properties of these detection systems and the electronics used to process the
signal are important because of short time scales of peri-detonation emissions.
4.1.1 Radiation Detectors
The multitude of available detector types allows for selection based on environmental and
emission conditions. One such type, scintillation detectors, have been used over many years
for photon detection. Light produced from the scintillation process is one of the oldest
methods for detecting radiation. Inorganic scintillators are the most popular because of
high scintillation light output and linearity [34]. Table 4.1 displays some popular inorganic



























































































































































































































































































For peri-detonation photon detection, the properties listed in Table 4.1 are all important.
A high density, fast decay time, and high light yield offer the best properties for peri-
detonation detection. From examination of the properties, the LaBr3(Ce) detector offers
the best properties for peri-detonation application due to the high density, fast decay time,
and high light output. The drawback of this detector is the intrinsic radioactivity from
138La which occurs 0.09% naturally and 227Ac resulting in approximately 1-2 counts
cm3−second
[34]. Because of the rapid photon emission from a prompt event, this characteristic hinders
capturing most of the events attributed to the device. Pulses registered from intrinsic ra-
dioactivity prevent other pulses from the device to be registered, if falling within the pulse
integration time.
Scintillation detectors offer several advantages for peri-detonation detection. Unfor-
tunately, scintillation detectors have poor energy resolution because the inefficiency in
converting radiation energy to electrical signal. Semiconductor detectors overcome this
inefficiency and offer superior energy resolution. A drawback of semiconductor detectors
is susceptibility to signal degradation from radiation damage [34]. Because of availability,
this research employed a HPGe detector. Peri-detonation would require the detector to be
present in the field at the time of the event. This presents another drawback for an HPGe
detector. The detector must be cooled to a temperature of around 77 K because of the small
bandgap (0.7 eV). Higher temperature operation would produce high leakage current [34].
4.1.2 Detection Electronics
The electronics used were developed by Costruzioni Apparecchiature Elettroniche Nucle-
ari S.p.A. (CAEN). The digitizers employed were the DT5730 and DT5780. LaBr3(Ce)
and EJ-309 detectors were run through the DT5730 while the HPGe utilized the DT5780.
Important features of the DT5730 and DT5780 were the high number of channels (8)
and the sampling rate of 500 Megasamples (MS)/second and 100 Megasamples/second,
respectively. The high sampling rate is important in rapid pulse processing required for
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peri-detonation emissions. The digitizers also contain multiple algorithms for digital pulse
processing (DPP) including pulse-shape discrimination (PSD) and pulse-height analysis
(PHA). Pulse-shape discrimination allows for categorization of photon versus neutron events
in the detector. This characteristic becomes important in LaBr3(Ce) and EJ-309 detectors
where neutron events are possible.
In the case of organic scintillators (e.g. EJ-309), prompt fluorescence dominates the
produced scintillation light with smaller contributions originating from delayed fluores-
cence. The prompt decay time is within a few nanoseconds while delayed decay spans
approximately several hundred [34]. This decay time becomes important when the delayed
component is examined. Conveniently, the fraction of light appearing in the delayed com-
ponent is related to the nature of the excited particle [34]. Neutrons will inherently have
larger delayed tails with photons creating smaller delayed tails. This aspect is leveraged
by setting a long and short-gate integration areas for capturing neutron and photon pulses,
respectively. This setting is shown in Figure 4.1. For peri-detonation, the passively measur-
able emissions include neutrons and photons which travel further in air and readily interact
in organic scintillators.
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Figure 4.1: Short (photon) and long-gate (neutron) setting depiction for pulse shape dis-
crimination. Ratio of the two gates yields groupings of photon or neutron interactions.
The amount of energy output from prompt neutron and photon emission between fissile
materials differ noticeably. For example, photon energy output was 0.0216% and 0.265%
for Hiroshima and Nagasaki devices which were primarily 235U and 239Pu fuels, respec-
tively. The neutron energy outputs were 0.127% and 0.0078% for Hiroshima and Nagasaki
[22]. These are exploitable differences relevant to peri-detonation detection.
4.2 Pertinent Peri-Detonation Detection Phenomena
Several physical factors exist that make peri-detonation detection challenging. The time
scale of the reactions that produce the measurable output is extremely short. Within this
short time scale, other competing mechanisms and emissions conflict with the desired mea-
surement. Also, current knowledge of the underlying nuclear reactions driving the high en-
ergy output is limited which confuses attributing prompt emissions with a specific physical
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mechanism.
4.2.1 Reaction and Detection Timing
The diminutive emission time presents the biggest challenge for peri-detection detection.
For perspective, 99.9% of a 100 kiloton energy release is obtained in the last 7 neutron
generations or approximately 0.07 microseconds equating to 1.00E-08 seconds
generation
. The total
time for a 100 kiloton energy release is approximately 58 generations or 5.80E-07 seconds
[3]. This energy release acceleration produces a rapid expansion and the reaction halts due
to the increased neutron leakage.
Of the inorganic scintillation detectors, LaBr3(Ce) offers the lowest decay time at
2.60E-08 seconds
pulse
. The decay time does not include the integration time of the pulse. This
research used a 3.36E-07 seconds
pulse
integration time. The inverse integration time, 2.98E+06
pulses
second
, is an upper rate limit of detectability for the LaBr3(Ce) detector. An idealistic ex-
ample, if 1.00E+20 monoenergetic photons
second
were incident on a 100% efficient LaBr3(Ce)
detector, 2.98E+06 photons would be detected over a period of 1 second. If the intrinsic
radioactivity, 1.5 counts
cm3−second (173.75 cm
3 − second) = 260.62 counts, is taken into account
this number drops further but not significantly. Detectors with higher decay/integration
times lose more prompt fission and activation signatures from the device.
4.2.2 Fission Process
The main driver of nuclear energy is the fission process. Fission prompt energy distri-
bution originates from kinetic energies of fission fragments — 165 ± 5 MeV and fission
neutrons — 5 MeV, and prompt photons — 6 ± 1 MeV. These byproducts are converted




0n −→ 23692 U∗ −→ 9542Mo+ 13957 La+ 2n
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Above, 23592 U absorbing a thermal neutron produces an excited
236
92 U intermediate product
before separation. In this case, the excitation energy comes from the unpaired neutron
separation energy in 23592 U plus the absorbed energy from the projectile or thermal neutron.
The kinetics and timing of the fission process can be further explained. Upon excitation,
236
92 U
∗ in the above case, the nucleus is deformed and fragments at around 10−14 seconds
which creates two neutron rich fragments. These fragments emit the excess neutrons at
approximately 10−17 seconds post-fission followed by prompt photons at 2x10−14 seconds
post-neutron emission. Once the fragments stop in the medium they are known as fission
products which release the remaining delayed fission energy in the form of β particles —
8 ± 1.5 MeV, antineutrinos — 12 ± 2.5 MeV, and photons — 6 ± 1 MeV [45].



































Figure 4.2: Fission product mass chain yields for 2.0 MeV neutrons incident on 235U and
239Pu.
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Figure 4.3: Fission product mass chain yields for 2.0 and 14.0 MeV neutrons incident on
235U .
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 show fission product mass chain yield distributions. The differences
between these yield curves are due to the fissile/fissionable targets and the incident neutron
energies. These subtle differences reveal clues into device characteristics.
All the recoverable energy is important in peri/post-detonation nuclear forensics. Other
forms of prompt radiation relevant in peri-detonation detection are radiative capture and
inelastic scatter of neutrons in the device components. Parasitic absorption leads to recov-
erable photon energies totaling approximately 12 MeV [45].
4.2.3 Inelastic Scatter/Radiative Capture Process and Emission
Because there is a distribution of neutron energies within a nuclear device, parasitic cap-
ture and inelastic neutron scatter will produce prompt photons. Inelastic scatter is prevalent
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when fast neutrons are present while radiative capture will occur with lower energy neu-
trons. Higher energy neutrons inelastically scatter off a nucleus producing an excited state
that emits a characteristic prompt photon and inherently lowers the scattered neutron en-
ergy [46]. These lower energy neutrons can be removed by radiative capture process. Once
a neutron is captured, the excited nucleus can de-excite by several processes. De-excitation
can occur by re-emission of the neutron but heavy nuclides and low energy neutrons causes
suppression of this decay mode and photon emission dominates [47]. Neutron capture pho-
ton emission spectrum consists of a primary and secondary component. Primary is direct
emission from the capture state to the lower excited states while secondary is low-energy
emission from those lower excited states [47]. In the case of peri-detonation, heavy nu-
clides are abundantly present and the neutron distribution contains low and high energy
neutrons making prompt activation and inelastic scattering a competing process in a nu-
clear device. For this application, fission, prompt activation, and inelastic scatter photons
are unresolvable because of the detection system’s ability to resolve this short time scale;
hence, contributing to the detector signal simultaneously.
4.3 Experimental Setup
The experimental setup was designed to examine the prompt reactivity insertion from a
Deuterium-Tritium (DT) fusion neutron source on fissile/fissionable targets and the result-
ing prompt photon/neutron emissions. The DT source emits approximately 1.0E+08 14-
MeV-neutrons/second with a pulse rate and width of 100 pulses/second and 10 microsec-
onds, respectively.
Fissile/fissionable targets consisted of 238U, 239Pu, 237Np, and a mix of 238U and 239Pu.
LaBr3(Ce), EJ-309, and HPGe detectors were placed at 90 degrees relative to the target
and source beam line. To reduce room scatter, the DT source was surrounded with 5-20%
borated polyethylene and the detectors were surrounded with lead bricks. Views 1 and 2
show positioning of the DT source and detectors and shown below in Figs. 4.4 and 4.5.
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Figure 4.4: View 1 of prompt photon/neutron emission experimental setup.
Figure 4.5: View 2 of prompt photon/neutron emission experimental setup.
Fissile/fissionable targets used were 239Pu, 237Np, and NatU. The 239Pu and NatU targets
were also combined and irradiated to show the change in photon/neutron emissions. The
NatU target slugs weigh 1.92 kilograms each and are encased in aluminum cladding [48].
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239Pu and 237Np targets weighed 5 and 0.5 grams, respectively. The four configurations
irradiated are shown in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Irradiated fissile/fissionable configurations.
239Pu [grams] NatU [grams] 237Np [grams]
Config. 1 5.0 0.0 0.0
Config. 2 5.0 3844.6 0.0
Config. 3 5.0 17300.8 0.0
Config. 4 0.0 17300.8 0.0
Config. 5 0.0 0.0 0.5
4.4 Detection Rate Comparisons
LaBr3(Ce) and EJ-309 detectors used the 5730 digitizers which acquired 500 MS/second
while the HPGe detector employed the 5780 version acquiring 100 MS/second. The sam-
pling rate is important for peri-detonation nuclear forensics because of the rapid progres-
sion of emission events. The 500 MS/second equates to 2 nanoseconds/sample while the
100 MS/second equates to 10 nanoseconds/sample.
The DT source has a pulse frequency of 100 Hertz with a pulse width of 10 microsec-
onds. With respect to the pulse frequency, the 500 MS/second and 100 MS/second equates
to 5E+6 and 1E+6 samples/pulse, respectively. The 10 microsecond pulse width equates to
5000 and 1000 samples acquired over the width of the pulse. The 500 MS/second sampling
rate captures 5 times more data than the 100 MS/second sampling rate.
4.4.1 EJ-309 Rate Results
EJ-309 detectors have the ability to detect neutrons and photons because of the composition
and setting of the short and long gate integration times known as pulse shape discrimina-
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tion (PSD). Distinguishing between neutron, photon, and pile-up events are important in
determining characteristics of the source.






















Mean x   962.8
Mean y  0.2953
Std Dev x    1669





Figure 4.6: Aggregated pulse shape discrimination fraction distribution from pulsed exper-
iment.
Examining and segregating the lobes found in Fig. 4.6 allows for discrimination of neutron,
photon, and pile-up events. Pile-up is important for aggregating rates of emission. A pile-
up event is determined if the PSD fraction value is outside of the neutron/photon areas or
lobes. The pile-up event is conservatively counted as 2 pulses. In reality, this number could
be higher but is hard to determine unless waveform data is available. Total neutron and
photon emission rates can also be determined by counting only events that are within the
PSD fraction bounds. Figs. 4.7 and 4.8 show the neutron and photon emission rates over
time.
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Figure 4.7: Neutron emission rate using an EJ-309 detector with NatU slugs as targets.















Figure 4.8: Photon emission rate using an EJ-309 detector with NatU slugs as targets.
Because of the low decay time and sampling rate, EJ-309 detectors clearly show the pulse
shape of the DT source. The capability is also shown if the pulse time - time of fission
- is integrated yielding a photon energy distribution. The magnitude of events hitting the
detector is exaggerated during this time and shows the capability of the detector to handle
high rates associated with prompt emissions. This attribute is also displayed in Fig. 4.9 and
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the ability to resolve photon energy information in the fission time period or when the DT
source is running.













Figure 4.9: Fission photon energy distribution shown by ADC channel using an EJ-309
detector with NatU slugs as targets.
The separability of neutron and photon events permits quantification of time depen-
dent proportional neutron to photon events. Photon and neutron output from fission differ
between fissile/fissionable nuclides. This emission signature can be used to strengthen con-
clusions and results from other detection systems. Characterizing the proportion of neutron
to photon events provides a rapid indicator of the dominant fuel type.
Rapid emission rates associated with nuclear detonations require fast detection systems.
The EJ-309 detection set-up allows for high rate acquisition and discrimination of neu-
tron/photon events which can be leveraged for gaining fuel-type information by exploiting
the differences in neutron/photon output. Unfortunately, the EJ-309 detector lacks energy
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resolution but is promising as an adjunct detector. Another candidate for fast detection is
the LaBr3(Ce) detector.
4.4.2 LaBr3(Ce) Rate Results
Similarly to EJ-309, LaBr3(Ce) has the ability to perform pseudo-PSD. This enables sep-
aration into photons and pile-up events as neutron events are less likely. As with EJ-309,
a photon rate can be determined by counting events falling within the photon lobe of the
LaBr3(Ce). Figure 4.10 shows the photon emission rate from a NatU target.













Figure 4.10: Photon emission rate using an LaBr3(Ce) detector with NatU slugs as targets.
More importantly, LaBr3(Ce) excels in high rate environments. Figure 4.11 shows the
integrated fission time period with NatU targets. The ability to handle high rates allows for
photon energy information to be obtained.
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Figure 4.11: Fission energy histogram using an LaBr3(Ce) detector with NatU slugs as
targets.
The high-rate capacity coupled to the higher energy resolution (compared to EJ-309)
makes this detection system a better candidate for peri-detonation detection. The ability for
the detector to obtain energy information at the highest rate period (fission) easily justifies
obtaining delayed photon emissions.
4.4.3 HPGe Rate Results
The HPGe detection system employed a different digitizer capable of 100 MS/second ac-
quisition. This sampling rate is 5 times less than the digitizers employed with the EJ-309
and LaBr3(Ce) detection systems. HPGe detectors have much longer decay times thus
pairing with faster electronics has minimal value for this particular application. Figure
4.12 shows the photon emission rate from the UNat targets.
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Figure 4.12: Photon emission rate using a HPGe detector with NatU slugs as targets.
The rate of emission is resolvable even with the lower sampling rate. Some detail is lost
when compared to the shape obtained in the EJ-309 and LaBr3(Ce) detection systems. This
detection system contains a pulse pile-up rejection system bounding the aggregated rate to
single photon emissions. The limitation of the HPGe detector is shown in Fig. 4.13.
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Figure 4.13: Fission energy distribution shown in ADC channel using a HPGe detector
with NatU slugs as targets.
When compared to previous fission spectra of the EJ-309 and LaBr3(Ce) detection systems,
the HPGe reveals a weakness. All events are shifted towards “high energies.” In reality, the
events recorded were mostly pile-up that were not rejected and placed in higher energy
bins mimicking single high-energy pulses. The shift to higher energies can occur from
the fast-shaping filter in the digitizer not being able to separate rapid successive events,
a baseline shift due to higher averaging from pile-up, or the pile-up events create higher
voltages which saturate the electronics. Because of the high rates, all these reasons likely
contribute to such a high shift. Logically, the fission photon spectrum should resemble the
shape found in previous Figs. 4.9 and 4.11.
The inability to resolve the fission photon spectrum and cooling requirement make the
HPGe detector a weaker candidate for front-end peri-detonation detection. However fol-




Considering the rate information in the previous sections, EJ-309 and LaBr3(Ce) detec-
tion systems house the capabilities to determine neutron/photon rates and resolve energy
information during the fission period. Also, the detectors do not require special cooling
requirements for operation. The EJ-309 detection system’s energy resolution is inferior to
LaBr3(Ce) but has the ability to discriminate neutron/photon events and hosts a faster decay
time.
With respect to the HPGe detection system, the cooling requirement coupled with the
inability to resolve energy information during the fission period is a clear drawback. HPGe
systems offer far superior energy resolution and the inability to leverage this attribute dur-
ing fission precludes its use during this time period. Rates drop considerably following
fission making the HPGe detection system more applicable during the back-end or delayed
emission time-period.
Ideally, the EJ-309 detection system is used for determining time-dependent neutron-
photon proportional events, neutron rates, photon rates, and aggregate rates. The LaBr3(Ce)
detection system is used for determining photon rates and crude (comparatively) fission
integrated photon emission energy distribution. Alternatively, the HPGe detection system
is used on the back-end peri-detonation or delayed time period to leverage the superior
energy resolution providing information on short-lived fission and activation products.
4.5 Peri-Detonation Detection Characterization Results
Results are presented in this section using the strongest attributes from the EJ-309, LaBr3(Ce),
and HPGe detection systems in order to assign early-time signatures. EJ-309 and LaBr3(Ce)
detection systems are used exclusively during the front-end time period while the HPGe and
LaBr3(Ce) detection systems are used for back-end or delayed emission characterization.
Optimistically, computational SA was run on the back-end time period following fission
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to the end of acquisition (0.01 seconds). The SA aggregated the counts in each 47 group
photon energy bin structure from end of fission to acquisition conclusion using the previ-
ously determined LaBr3(Ce) detector response function. Noteworthy, the same regions of
interest (ROI) were examined using the HPGe detection system. To highlight the superior
energy resolution, the delayed energy histogram from each target nuclide was examined to
visually determine ROI(s) for the delayed time-period.
4.5.1 Computational Sensitivity Analysis Results Applied to Experimental Peri-Detonation
Detection
Making use of previous sensitivity analysis results, potential ROIs are determined from
examining the main effect indices, Si, and the total effect, ST , values. For brevity, the SA
results used showed the highest fractional main effect “purity” of sensitivity, meaning the
difference between Si and ST values (amount of interactions) was minimized. Also, only
239Pu and 238U sensitivity indices are shown because of the targets used in the experimen-
tal analysis. The top energy ranges were determined by eliminating energy ranges with
high computational uncertainty (> 3 MeV), energies lower than 100 keV which natural
background and electronic noise affect, and energies around 511 keV which is the energy
associated with positron annihilation. Once these energy ranges are eliminated, the purity




|SkT − Ski |
(4.1)
where:
SkPurity is the purity metric for nuclide k,
Ski is the main effect sensitivity index for nuclide k,
SkT is the total sensitivity index for nuclide k,
|SkT − Ski | is the interaction amount of nuclide k with other variables.
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Table 4.3: 239Pu sensitivity “purity” calculated from Si and ST values.
Energy Range [MeV] Purity
3.000E-01 - 2.600E-01 0.3943
3.000E+00 - 2.750E+00 0.0912
1.500E-01 - 1.000E-01 0.0702
2.000E-01 - 1.500E-01 0.0583
1.200E+00 - 1.000E+00 0.0508
7.000E-01 - 6.000E-01 0.0203
2.500E+00 - 2.350E+00 0.0202
2.000E+00 - 1.800E+00 0.0192
2.350E+00 - 2.150E+00 0.0185
2.750E+00 - 2.500E+00 0.0170
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Table 4.4: 238U sensitivity “purity” calculated from Si and ST values.
Energy Range [MeV] Purity
2.500E+00 - 2.350E+00 28.7353
2.350E+00 - 2.150E+00 19.7467
9.000E-01 - 8.000E-01 9.7064
3.000E+00 - 2.750E+00 6.2667
2.750E+00 - 2.500E+00 5.2323
1.500E-01 - 1.000E-01 4.9412
2.000E+00 - 1.800E+00 4.0564
3.000E-01 - 2.600E-01 3.2312
1.200E+00 - 1.000E+00 3.1166
4.500E-01 - 4.000E-01 2.9806
238U purity values are noticeably higher than 239Pu values. The lower purity values associ-
ated with 239Pu stem from high interactions in those photon energy bins. 235U sensitivities
are also considered because of the small amounts present in the NatU slugs.
Table 4.5 shows ratio values for each configuration or mixtures for the LaBr3(Ce) de-
tection system. The top 10 main effect purities of 239Pu and 238U displayed in Tables 4.3
and 4.4 aided determination of ratios found in Table 4.5 which show clear sensitivities to
the nuclides. Also, the 2.600E-01 - 2.000E-01 MeV energy bin was absent from the 239Pu
and 238U purity tables but was a high purity for 235U.
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Table 4.5: Selected experimental ratio delayed emission results from SA guided analy-
sis. **Acquired during fission or front-end time period. See Table 4.2 for configuration
specifications.
Energy Range Ratio [MeV] Config. 1 Config. 2 Config. 3 Config. 4
0.2−0.26
0.1−0.15 2.02 3.52 5.16 7.66
0.26−0.3
0.1−0.15 0.64 1.55 2.70 4.54
0.26−0.3
0.2−0.26 0.32 0.44 0.52 0.59
0.26−0.3
0.2−0.26** 0.58 0.74 1.36 1.60
0.4−0.45
0.2−0.26 0.75 0.59 0.56 0.51
0.8−0.9
0.6−0.7 0.80 0.61 0.47 0.52
2.35−2.5
0.26−0.3 0.0094 0.0024 0.0020 -0.00094
The selected results displayed in Table 4.5 show clear sensitivities to the fissile/fissionable
fuel present during irradiation. The fuel-type sensitivities are indicated by the monotoni-
cally increasing/decreasing nature of the selected ratios which contain differing proportions
of fissile/fissionable fuel. Energy ranges were from the photon 47-group structure. Neg-
ative values indicate the background counts overtook the target photon emissions. Inter-
estingly, the 0.26−0.3
0.2−0.26 ratio followed the same trend during irradiation or the prompt fission
period which indicates fuel-type sensitivities and relationships can be determined during
the prompt burnup. Acquisition during the fission time period is possible due to the short
decay time of the detector. The EJ-309 detector is also capable of handling higher emission
rates but can be leveraged in a different manner.
Because of the composition of the detector, the EJ-309 can be used for discrimination
between photon and neutron events. Fissile/fissionable isotopes emit different proportions
of neutrons and photons during and after fission. The ratio of photon to neutron events can
be used as a rough approximation of the fissile isotope. Figures 4.14 and 4.15 show the
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time-dependent photon to neutron proportions.

































Figure 4.14: Time-dependent photon to neutron ratio associated with 239Pu acquired from
an EJ-309 detector.
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Figure 4.15: Time-dependent photon to neutron ratio associated with NatU acquired from
an EJ-309 detector.
There is a considerable difference between 239Pu and NatU photon to neutron emission
proportions. The trend follows the prompt emission proportions from the cited Fat Man
and Little Boy devices with Fat Man, 239Pu, emitting photons an order of magnitude higher
[22].
HPGe detection systems have far superior energy resolution but are vulnerable to high
emission rates. Delayed emissions during the back-end time period output considerably
lower rates compared to the front-end fission period. Taking advantage of the superior
energy resolution, ROIs can be determined from examining the integrated delayed emission
spectrum. Figure 4.16 shows two ROIs that can be used for the proportion of 239Pu present
during irradiation.
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Figure 4.16: Overlaid uncalibrated delayed photon emission spectra for configs. 1-4 used
for region of interest determination.
There is a clear sensitivity to the amount 239Pu present. The channel ROIs are 450-680
and 1100-1520 translating into 0.440-0.676 and 1.106-1.536 MeV energy ranges. The
0.440−0.676MeV
1.106−1.536MeV ratio values are: -0.0054, 0.30, 0.46, and 0.64 for configs. 1-4, respectively.
Coupling previous SA results and exploiting detector system strengths provides early-
time signatures used for rapid fuel-type determination. The computational SA results pro-
vided fuel-type sensitivities, by the purity metric and regression analysis, that were used
for ROI determination. The ROIs behaved well with differing 239Pu and 238U amounts
present during irradiation. Interestingly, the LaBr3(Ce) produced 0.26−0.3MeV0.2−0.26MeV ratio showed
clear fuel-type sensitivities during the irradiation period which could give an instantaneous
estimation of the dominant fuel-type present. Results from each detection system provide
multiple indicators of fuel-type which fortify early-time conclusions.
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CHAPTER 5
PERI-DETONATION NUCLEAR FORENSIC CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE
WORK
The phenomena surrounding a nuclear detonation present daunting challenges for technical
nuclear forensics at early-times. Identifying the factors that affect the emission signatures
enables a finer focus on technical analysis and facilitates attribution efforts. The potential
consequences and impacts stemming from a detonation necessitates high quality data with
known, minimized, uncertainties. Preferably, building a rapid attribution mechanism de-
ters nuclear terrorism, state, and non-state actors from the proliferation and use of nuclear
devices.
5.1 Sensitivity and Uncertainty Analysis Conclusions
Because the input space of influential factors is vast, identifying the important factors en-
ables model order reduction, places bounds on inferences, and leads to better conclusions.
Passively measurable emissions offer promising information which may be used for attri-
bution. Emission profiles change during the peri-detonation period based on dynamic phys-
ical phenomena which drives nuclear reactions and processes. Emissions associated with
fission, inelastic neutron scatter, and structural activation dominate the burnup or front-end
period while fission product decay dominates the back-end or delayed period. Each period
holds important information used for rapidly determining key aspects in nuclear device de-
sign and the surrounding conditions. The characteristics of the blast may then be used for
narrowing down potential source(s).
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5.1.1 Point-Source Model Conclusions
Point-source model development focused on early-time fission product emissions. The de-
rived sensitivity indices were used for MCF model acceleration and provided the source
term in the nuclear cloud rise period. The versatility of SA was mainly demonstrated in
the point-source model. Indices were generated with and without LaBr3(Ce) detector re-
sponses, for fractionated and unfractionated samples. Also, integrated counts over specified
periods were analyzed for the MCF acceleration scheme and nuclear cloud rise period. The
sensitivity measures provide a time- and energy-dependent importance guide for analysis
focusing research efforts.
The 47-group energy structure was chosen for photon emissions during the front-end
and back-end peri-detonation times. This structure appears small considering emissions
span wide energy ranges but proved satisfactory and necessary for data generation and
subsequent analysis. At the beginning of point-source analysis, the photon rate (photons
second
) in
each of the energy bins, with and without detector response functions, were examined.
As suspected, the rates in all the energy bins were mostly affected by the neutron flux
in the device which is shown in Fig. 5.1. The flux variable affected all the energy bins over
the entirety of the analysis time which is demonstrated by the small 2σ range.
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Figure 5.1: Unfractionated Si values averaged over photon energy bins for flux, spectrum,
238U, and 235U with flux variable being the highest contributor to photon production.
While the flux was the dominant effect, the relationship was not linear and included interac-
tions between other variables. Nonlinearities and interactions are shown in the magnitude
of the Si value in Fig. 5.1 with a value of 1 being a perfect linear relationship and 0 indicat-
ing no linear relationship. To provide perspective to this observation, Fig. 5.2 below shows
the energy group 27 (1.00-1.20 MeV) fitting function for determining the nuclear device
flux at 1 second after detonation.
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R 2 = 0. 993








Figure 5.2: Unfractionated flux association with 1.0-1.2 MeV photon energy bin rate at 1.0
second after detonation.
The low Si value of the flux is explained by the nonlinear fitting function derived in Fig.
5.2. Also, the obvious spread of the data towards higher photon rates explains the low Si
value. Because the flux has a higher (relative) importance in each energy bin, the yield of
the device has a near linear relationship with rate in the detector as shown in Fig. 5.3.
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Figure 5.3: Unfractionated yield association with 1.0-1.2 MeV photon energy bin rate at
1.0 second after detonation.
Notably, the flux also affected the fractionated sample similarly; although, fuel-type sen-
sitivities increased at late times. The increase in importance for the various fuel-types is
thought to be associated with the small emission rate at late times. Higher fuel-type im-
portances were also in the higher energy bins which contained the highest amount of error.
Low emission rates coupled with the uncertainty in the energy bin precludes stating higher
importance for the different fuel-types.
A more realistic representation of importance factors is revealed once the detector re-
sponse is applied. Conversely, with the previous results using raw photon rates, fuel-type
sensitivities/importances began to surface by integrating the counts following the front-end
period. Each of the fuel-types examined, flux, and spectrum values show stronger linear
correlations. Moreover, variables interact unpredictably across each energy bin empha-
sizing the need for comparing Si and ST values associated with each variable. Further
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examination of the Si and ST values reveals candidate energy ranges used in ratios for fuel
type determination which is later applied to accelerate the MCF algorithm and experimental
portion of this research.
Monte Carlo Filtering Acceleration Conclusions
Results from the point-source SA and local sensitivity methods guided determination of
the MCF acceleration scheme. To avoid hydrodynamic calculations associated with fire-
ball expansion, ratios were integrated between the conclusion of fission and 0.1 seconds
using the calculated detector response function. Si and ST values were used to calculate a
fractional main-effect purity metric which is shown below in Eq. 5.1. The purity metric and




|SkT − Ski |
(5.1)
where:
SkPurity is the purity metric for nuclide k,
Ski is the main effect sensitivity index for nuclide k,
SkT is the total sensitivity index for nuclide k,
|SkT − Ski | is the interaction amount of nuclide k with other variables.
Because of the flux uncertainty and sampling technique, the found relationships con-
tained upper and lower bounds. An example of this is shown in Fig. 5.4 with the group 15
(2.75-3.00 MeV) to 22 (1.57-1.66 MeV) ratio applied to 239Pu fractional mass present dur-
ing irradiation. Because ORIGEN performs a point-source irradiation, the fractional mass
value can be roughly compared to the fractional fissions from each examined fuel-type.
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Figure 5.4: 239Pu fractional mass from the Egrp15
Egrp22
ratio with associated prediction bounds.
The shape of the values in Fig. 5.4 is due to the stratified sampling technique. Stratified
sampling was applied to ensure the coverage of all possible fuel, reflector, and flux com-
binations. For comparison, random sampling was applied in Fig. 5.3 which can produce
nonphysical configurations. Stratified sampling increases convergence of Si and ST values
faster than random sampling [17]. Also, the shape of the data in Fig. 5.4 shows the ef-
fect of the flux on the ratio which was a result of the sampling technique. The sampling
method fortuitously demonstrates the effect of an unknown device flux on the ratio value.
If the flux was known, the prediction bounds would shrink making the results more accu-
rate. Realistically and because of the time constraint, flux values are unknown and force
the fitted answer to fall between the upper and lower bound. Regardless, all ratios allowed
for acceleration of the MCF algorithm and dramatically reduced the input space.
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Table 5.1: MCF acceleration fractional mass results for Fat Man (FM) and Little Boy (LB)
reference cases.
Nuclide - Reference Case [Ratio] Lower Limit Average Upper Limit
233U - FM [G29/G31] -0.0744 -0.0536 -0.0257
233U - LB [G29/G31] -0.2946 -0.1747 -0.07246
235U - FM [G20/G21] 0.0307 0.0475 0.0657
235U - LB [G20/G21] 0.6141 0.7736 0.8372
238U - FM [G17/G19] -0.0173 -0.0138 0.1065
238U - LB [G17/G19] 0.0257 0.0577 0.1887
239Pu - FM [G15/G22] -0.0744 -0.0536 -0.0257
239Pu - LB [G15/G22] -0.0496 -0.0324 -0.0149
Notably, MCF acceleration relationships were not considered for the other reflector
types - Tungsten, Lead, and Iridium. The local sensitivity methods produced unusable ratio
values which mimicked Dirac delta functions (undefined slope) at a given ratio amount or
simply a vertical line when fractional mass versus ratio amount was plotted. These reflec-
tors were quickly eliminated based on a lack of matched configurations in an abbreviated
MCF run with looser scoring requirements and less samples.
The MCF results presented in Table 5.1 drastically reduced the inputs into the main
MCF algorithm. These results further illustrate the effect of an unknown flux on the pre-
dictive relationships. For example, 235U is a small component (0.72 atom %) in NatU but
the MCF acceleration results show a fractional mass value between 0.0307 and 0.0657.
The fractional mass result for 235U apropos to the Fat Man design derivative indicates the
possible existence of 235U in the device or a possible input into the MCF algorithm.
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5.1.2 Monte Carlo Filtering and Nuclear Cloud Rise Conclusions
The developed MCF algorithm performed adequately with associated nuclear data uncer-
tainties. The prior derived acceleration results also performed adequately in shrinking the
input space and drastically reduced run times. Without the acceleration scheme, run times
were unreasonable and a large number of samples did not guarantee coverage of the entire
input space which increased the uncertainties associated with mass, density, and height-of-
burst.
After optimization of the MCF algorithm, a low number of stratified samples was run
on the narrowed input space. In the case of the Fat Man derivative design, no configura-
tions of 239Pu with an HEU reflected or bare assembly were matched. The acceleration
results indicated the presence of 235U and 238U leaving the NatU reflector. The problem
was repeated again using the same amount of samples but using tighter mass and density
ranges with a NatU reflector, pure 239Pu, WGPu, Aged WGPu, and FGPu. The matched
results indicated pure 239Pu, WGPu, or FGPu fuel-types with a NatU reflector. Results are
summarized in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Monte Carlo Filtering algorithm results for Fat Man configuration. Weighted
and non-weighted estimates of fuel and reflector mass, yield, height-of-burst, and density.
239Pu/NatU 239Pu/NatU (HOB Weighted)
Fuel Mass [kg] 6.84 ± 1.17 6.84 ± 1.18
Reflector Mass [kg] 112.66 ± 24.23 112.68 ± 24.23
Yield [kt] 15.37 ± 0.93 15.37 ± 0.93
HOB [cm] 10226.72 ± 206.92 10226.57 ± 207.06
Density [ g
cm3
] 31.60 ± 3.59 31.60 ± 3.59
The results of the Fat Man derivative are accurate and matched the reference spectrum well.
Averaged and HOB weighted results are nearly identical because of the stringent scoring
system which accounts for rate, integral counts, and shape of the spectrum. The precision
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of the values is attributed to the rate score which was resolvable with the prescribed time
steps (10 steps from 0 to 1.0E-06 seconds). The resolution of the rate at early-times was
due to the large NatU reflector that impeded early-time photon emission signal which did
not saturate the detector. The signatures emanating from nuclear cloud rise allowed for the
HOB to be determined accurately which can be used as a secondary signature if prompt
data is not available. The nuclear cloud rise takes place at extended times (comparatively)
and the photon rates can easily be resolved. Interestingly, the MCF algorithm matched
100% 239Pu to FGPu (86.1% by mass 239Pu) to the reference Fat Man derivative spectrum
which contained 100% 239Pu. The FGPu matched cases contained higher mass and den-
sity estimates which is indicative of higher amounts of 240Pu (12%) creating lower device
yields. Simply, the higher mass and density values made up for the higher 240Pu amounts
which created the same photon rate in the detector volume. While 240Pu created higher
mass and density estimates, the spectrum shape between FGPu and pure 239Pu were close
in proximity creating similar behavior. Because the NatU reflector mass was constant, the
higher FGPu mass and density values allowed the leakage spectrum to mimic the refer-
ence Fat Man derivative which shows the emissions are highly dependent on the reflector
configuration/reactions.
At first glance, the Little Boy derivative design results were less accurate containing
high error. The error can be explained by the nature of the design. The Little Boy deriva-
tive was modeled as a bare assembly allowing for the leakage spectrum to be unimpeded.
Higher leakage emissions cause earlier detector saturation which poses as a detector that is
incapable of resolving high emission rates (e.g. HPGe). In reality, the quick “saturation”
results from the low number of modeled time steps. Although yield and HOB results were
high in error, the calculated fuel mass contained less error and fell close to the actual value
confirming leakage and detector signal is highly dependent on mass. Results are shown in
Tables 5.3 and 5.4.
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Table 5.3: Monte Carlo Filtering algorithm results for Little Boy configuration. Weighted
and non-weighted estimates of fuel and reflector mass, yield, and height-of-burst.
235U/Air 235U/Air (HOB Weighted)
Fuel Mass [kg] 45.07 ± 4.72 44.87 ± 5.18
Reflector Mass [kg] N/A N/A
Yield [kt] 104.86 ± 114.52 109.82 ± 118.42
HOB [cm] 18139.58 ± 5359.15 18258.86 ± 5843.24
Table 5.4: Monte Carlo Filtering algorithm results for Little Boy configuration following
secondary cloud rise module scoring requirement. Weighted and non-weighted estimates
of fuel and reflector mass, yield, and height-of-burst.
235U/Air 235U/Air (HOB Weighted)
Fuel Mass [kg] 39.07 ± 1.51 39.08 ± 1.52
Reflector Mass [kg] N/A N/A
Yield [kt] 11.71 ± 1.68 11.79 ± 1.66
HOB [cm] 12429.16 ± 612.46 12457.34 ± 602.18
Because the front-end fission period uses the same scoring system as the back-end nuclear
cloud rise period, results can be further filtered by “passing” values associated with the nu-
clear cloud rise signatures. Using the nuclear cloud rise signatures produces more accurate
results across all variables. The effect of the secondary filter on the results emphasizes the
detector signal is highly dependent on neutron activation, attenuation, and fission product
emissions during nuclear cloud rise. Luckily, high dependency demonstrates the ability
to use nuclear cloud rise signatures to deduce design and condition characteristics in the
absence of prompt front-end fission data.
Because the MCF algorithm gives mass and energy output estimates, a hypothetical de-
vice fission efficiency estimate can be calculated which is highly useful for sophistication
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determination. The Fat Man and Little Boy design derivatives produced device fission ef-
ficiency estimates of 12.81 ± 2.32% and 1.71 ± 0.19%, respectively. Rapid sophistication
indicators provide useful information about potential sources or intent. Efficiency coupled
with HOB estimates may provide nuclear forensic relevant information.
5.1.3 Peri-Detonation Uncertainty Conclusions
With any computational model, the associated data and assumptions inject uncertainties
into the results. In this case, passively measurable signatures contain uncertainty stemming
from cross-sections, fission product yields, and decay data. The developed model propa-
gates the nuclear data uncertainty from the prompt front-end period through the back-end
decay period. Ultimately, these uncertainties dictate which energies can be used for analy-
sis based on limiting the uncertainty.






















Figure 5.5: Nuclear device yield distribution from cross-section uncertainties.
Figure 5.5 shows the effect of cross-section uncertainty on total energy output. The
device yield standard error resulting from the cross-section was calculated as 7.6%. These
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errors propagate into fission product emissions due to the dependence on neutron spec-
trum shape and magnitude. The decay emissions were then used to generate the signatures
emanating from early-time nuclear cloud rise.














































Figure 5.6: Fat Man design derivative photon emission absolute uncertainty between 0.0
and 60.0 seconds.
The propagated uncertainty fundamentally determines quality of conclusions and time of
analysis. Figure 5.6 shows the compounded photon emission error originating from the
prompt front-end period and extending through the decay back-end period. The decay pe-
riod error results from cross-section, decay, and fission product yields. Energies over 10
MeV at late times contain high amounts of error which lead to erroneous predictions and
conclusions. During the prompt period, errors are lower and produce more accurate pre-
dictions and conclusions. Another limiting factor of detectability is the effective distance
of the photon emissions which also injects error.
127
5.1.4 Peri-Detonation Effective Detectability Distance Conclusions
An effective detectability distance study was completed to provide a maximum distance for
detectability considering nuclear data and counting error within the detector. The uncertain-
ties from nuclear data coupled with counting error showed clear limitations in detectability.
The counting error was calculated by integrating the count rate within the detector over 60
seconds at distances between 400 and 8050 meters (approximately 0.25-5.0 miles). Note-
worthy, the previous MCF matching algorithm was held static at 400 meters. This short
distance from a nuclear explosion would destroy any detection system well before the 60
second mark further necessitating a distance study. Interestingly, the Little Boy design
derivative “saturated” the detector at 400 meters. The saturation was due to the large time
steps used for the prompt period mimicking a saturated detector or a less advanced detec-
tion system. Detector saturation produced high errors in the matching algorithm but fortu-
itously proved the use of signatures emanating from nuclear cloud rise for gaining device
characteristics. The distance study provided perspective on optimum detector placement
and showed that increasing the distance from detonation lessened detector saturation with
the Little Boy design derivative. Distance error results place a minimum distance limit
of detector placement as proximity saturates and destroys the detection system while long
distances produce high errors from dwindling counting statistics.
The Fat Man design derivative standard error reached 100% for all energy bins except
the 0.01-0.02 MeV energy range at 3300 meters. Unfortunately, this energy range is easily
attenuated/shielded and obfuscated by natural background radiation and electronic noise.
Figures 5.7 and 5.8 show heat maps of the standard error over distance and energy.
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Figure 5.7: Fat Man design derivative fractional uncertainty of energy bins resulting from
distance away from nuclear detonation.
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Figure 5.8: Zoomed Fat Man design derivative fractional uncertainty of energy bins result-
ing from distance away from nuclear detonation.
Clearly, 3300 meters is an absolute cut-off point of passive photon detectability for the
Fat Man design derivative. If the ratios for determining the fractional mass and presence
of an isotope are used for optimization, the greatest distances of detectability for a Fat
Man design derivative is 2200, 1900, and 1700 meters for errors less than 50, 25, and 5%,
respectively. If the higher energy range (2.35-2.5 MeV) is removed, the distances extend to
2500 (50%), 2200(25%), and 1900(5%) meters. From a global perspective, 1.0-6.0 MeV
energy range effective distances are 1900(50%), 1700(25%), and 1400(5%) meters while
under 1.0 MeV gives distances of 1900(50%), 1900(25%), and 1700(5%) meters.
The Fat Man design derivative effective detectability distance study indicated 1700 me-
ters would minimize error in counting for the 0.01-6.0 MeV energy range. Over 6 MeV, the
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error is high, drastically reducing the distance required for error minimization and likely
destroying the detection system before any information can be relayed.
Little Boy design derivative error differed from the Fat Man design derivative. Al-
though, at first glance of Figure 5.9 shows little difference between the Fat Man and Little
Boy design derivatives integral detection uncertainty. Figure 5.10 is more telling and shows
the fractional difference between the two designs which is higher in certain energy ranges.
The error behavior is due to the differing photon outputs between fissile isotopes and the
geometry which affects photon leakage.










































Figure 5.9: Little Boy design derivative heat map of detection uncertainty associated with
distance from ground zero.
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Figure 5.10: Uncertainty fractional difference between Fat Man and Little Boy design
derivatives heat map associated with distance from ground zero.
There is a clear band of high uncertainty between the two designs starting between 7 and
12 MeV at close distances which is an exclusion zone for detector placement. The lower
uncertainty band between the two designs beginning at approximately 4 and 6 MeV at close
distances extends to approximately 2000 meters. Nuclear device design is unknown before
detector placement. Uncertainty between the two designs must be minimized because the
design type is unknown before detector placement. Simply, each design is a possibility and
must be considered. For energies lower than 6 MeV, 1700 meters would minimize both
error in counting and error between the two designs.
5.2 Experimental Conclusions
Experimentally, the front-end fission period through the back-end delayed period encom-
passed 0.01 seconds including irradiation of the source and a delayed emission period. Five
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different target “configurations” were irradiated with the DT source. Descriptions of the
configurations are found in Table 5.5. The low amount (0.5 grams) of 237Np and the lack
of sensitivity indices precluded further analysis of early-time signatures from 237Np.
Table 5.5: Irradiated fissile/fissionable configurations.
239Pu [grams] NatU [grams] 237Np [grams]
Config. 1 5.0 0.0 0.0
Config. 2 5.0 3844.6 0.0
Config. 3 5.0 17300.8 0.0
Config. 4 0.0 17300.8 0.0
Config. 5 0.0 0.0 0.5
Logically, the emission rates during a nuclear detonation are high, placing limitations
on detection method and equipment employed. The rate limitations of the HPGe precluded
its use in the front-end fission period as shown in Fig. 5.11. The integrated counts over the
10 microsecond wide pulse are pushed towards “high energies” while in reality the detector
is accepting pulse pile-up resembling a single high energy photon pulse. Imitation higher
energy pulses can occur for a number of reasons and are likely compounded. The shift
to higher energies can occur from the fast-shaping filter in the digitizer not being able to
separate rapid successive events, a baseline shift due to higher averaging from pile-up, or
the pile-up events create higher voltages which can saturate the electronics.
133














Figure 5.11: Fission uncalibrated energy histogram shown in ADC channel using a HPGe
detector with NatU slugs as targets.
EJ-309 and LaBr3(Ce) detectors can manage high emission rates as shown in Fig. 5.12.
The energy histogram can be resolved during high emission rate fission period. PSD can be
performed with the LaBr3(Ce) and EJ-309 detection systems segregating neutron, photon,
and pile-up events. This feature allows for neutron, photon, and total rates to be determined
along with confidently counting desired particles (i.e. neutron vs. photon events).
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Figure 5.12: Fission uncalibrated energy histogram shown in ADC channel using an
LaBr3(Ce) detector with NatU slugs as targets.
The SA used in the computational section provided global and local sensitivity metrics
for experimental analysis. Specifically, the SA produced purity metric aided determina-
tion of the ROIs used for experimental analysis. The interval of SA analysis was at the
conclusion of irradiation to 0.01 seconds matching the period of analysis in the experimen-
tal portion. The integral counts between this interval were used in both experimental and
computational portions.
Only 239Pu and 238U calculated purity metrics are shown because they were the ex-
clusive targets used in the experimental analysis. Top energy ranges were determined by
eliminating energy ranges with high computational uncertainty (> 3 MeV), energies lower
than 100 keV which are obfuscated by natural background and electronic noise, and ener-
gies around 511 keV which is the energy associated with positron annihilation. Once these
energy ranges are eliminated, the purity metric is shown below in Eq. 5.2 and top 10 energy
ranges are displayed in Tables 5.6 and 5.7.
SkPurity =
Ski




SkPurity is the purity metric for nuclide k,
Ski is the main effect sensitivity index for nuclide k,
SkT is the total sensitivity index for nuclide k,
|SkT − Ski | is the interaction amount of nuclide k with other variables.
Table 5.6: 239Pu sensitivity “purity” calculated from Si and ST values.
Energy Range [MeV] Purity
3.000E-01 - 2.600E-01 0.3943
3.000E+00 - 2.750E+00 0.0912
1.500E-01 - 1.000E-01 0.0702
2.000E-01 - 1.500E-01 0.0583
1.200E+00 - 1.000E+00 0.0508
7.000E-01 - 6.000E-01 0.0203
2.500E+00 - 2.350E+00 0.0202
2.000E+00 - 1.800E+00 0.0192
2.350E+00 - 2.150E+00 0.0185
2.750E+00 - 2.500E+00 0.0170
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Table 5.7: 238U sensitivity “purity” calculated from Si and ST values.
Energy Range [MeV] Purity
2.500E+00 - 2.350E+00 28.7353
2.350E+00 - 2.150E+00 19.7467
9.000E-01 - 8.000E-01 9.7064
3.000E+00 - 2.750E+00 6.2667
2.750E+00 - 2.500E+00 5.2323
1.500E-01 - 1.000E-01 4.9412
2.000E+00 - 1.800E+00 4.0564
3.000E-01 - 2.600E-01 3.2312
1.200E+00 - 1.000E+00 3.1166
4.500E-01 - 4.000E-01 2.9806
238U purity values are noticeably higher than 239Pu values. The lower purity values asso-
ciated with 239Pu stem from high interactions in those photon energy bins. Notably, all
the ratios used in the experimental portion and found in Table 5.8 stem from 238U and
239Pu purity metrics except the 2.600E-01 - 2.000E-01 MeV energy bin. The 2.600E-01 -
2.000E-01 MeV energy bin was found to have a high purity value for 235U which was also
present, albeit small, during irradiation.
137
Table 5.8: Selected experimental ratio delayed emission results from SA guided analysis.
**Acquired during fission or front-end period. See Table 5.5 for configuration specifica-
tions.
Ratio [MeV] Config. 1 Config. 2 Config. 3 Config. 4
0.2−0.26
0.1−0.15 2.02 3.52 5.16 7.66
0.26−0.3
0.1−0.15 0.64 1.55 2.70 4.54
0.26−0.3
0.2−0.26 0.32 0.44 0.52 0.59
0.26−0.3
0.2−0.26** 0.58 0.74 1.36 1.60
0.4−0.45
0.2−0.26 0.75 0.59 0.56 0.51
0.8−0.9
0.6−0.7 0.80 0.61 0.47 0.52
2.35−2.5
0.26−0.3 0.0094 0.0024 0.0020 -0.00094
Results of this analysis are shown in Table 5.8 using the sensitivity indices/purity met-
ric derived from computational calculations. Table 5.8 shows sensitivities to the amount
of NatU and 239Pu present during irradiation. The ratios used provide indicators of fuel
present with 0.01 seconds. Also, the 0.26−0.3MeV
0.2−0.26MeV ratio behaved well within the short 10
microsecond fission period yielding an instantaneous indicator of fuel type. While the re-
sults show sensitivities, irradiations with more coverage of fissile fuel proportions would
provide better indications of emission dependencies. Regardless, the ratios displayed clear
sensitivities to the fuel types present and energy range sensitivity indices developed from
the SA promoted faster and more focused experimental analyses.
5.3 Peri-Detonation Policy Implications
The rise in nuclear smuggling and nuclear criminal activity has brought into question tra-
ditional deterrence strategy [49]. One technical indirect deterrence strategy involves devel-
oping and maintaining stronger nuclear treaty monitoring programs. Stronger monitoring
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programs, such as the CTBTO employed passive monitoring stations have conceivably de-
terred nuclear states from conducting nuclear weapon testing. Implementing and advancing
passive monitoring capabilities supplements existing nuclear deterrence strategies.
Deterring nuclear states from using nuclear weapons follows Cold War logic where
boundaries and consequences were clearly defined. The advancement of nuclear device
design and strike capabilities offers a limited deterrent when applied to nuclear terrorism.
Lack of controls and the global availability of nuclear material increases the likelihood of
nuclear terrorism.
Cases of state sponsored nuclear proliferation increase possibilities of nuclear terror-
ism. North Korea allegedly transferred and sold Libya approximately 2 metric tons of un-
enriched uranium but pledged to not transfer to terrorists [49]. Countries with known ties to
terrorism raise concerns when nuclear capabilities are sought. Moreover, a country on the
verge of collapse or drastic political change presents greater risk of assisting and providing
a means to nuclear terrorists with the hopes of creating a tangential “swan song” strike [49].
The opinion exists, that the retaliation magnitude of the U.S., or other country(ies), and the
fear of attribution deters states from transferring nuclear materials to terrorist organizations
[49]. Nuclear forensic science empirically bolsters fear of discovery and creates an indirect
deterrent to potential source state proliferation complementing direct deterrence measures.
Post-detonation nuclear forensics provides technical nuclear forensic information which
may be used for attribution purposes. Current collection techniques and analysis methods
require extended time lines that potentially hinder timely attribution. There are many ques-
tions surrounding the ability of post-detonation nuclear forensics contributing to and sup-
porting attribution. Peri-detonation nuclear forensics provides empirical technical nuclear
forensics information and avoids complications with timely debris collection.
Peri-detonation period of time encompasses effects up to roughly 60 seconds. The
nuclear cloud from a 20 kiloton surface burst reaches 2 miles at this time which is approxi-
mately the effective distance of gamma rays creating a limit of detectability and appropriate
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cut-off point. These phenomena were divided into 2 periods, front-end prompt burnup and
back-end delayed emission. The front-end time-period encompass fission, structural, and
environmental emissions while the back-end interval encompasses fission product and en-
vironment activation emissions.
SA computational results coupled with the MCF algorithm, indicate passively measur-
able emissions can be used to infer device characteristics. These early-time device char-
acteristics point to source sophistication and intent. Fat Man derivative results showed the
effect of a resolvable rate during the front-end fission period on matching accuracy. While
the Little Boy design derivative results contained high error because of the unresolvable
rate which is caused by higher emission leakage. These high errors due to unresolvable
rates were drastically reduced when the nuclear cloud rise signatures were considered. If
data is unavailable or unusable during the prompt period, signatures from nuclear cloud rise
up to 60 seconds may provide useful technical nuclear forensic information for attribution.
Configuration derivative results allowed for hypothetical efficiency estimates indicat-
ing sophistication level. Sophistication and HOB estimates are clear indicators of source
capability and intent. A low HOB coupled with crude device design conceivably stipulates
terrorist activity (or the outward appearance) while a high HOB and a sophisticated design
may be indicative of a sophisticated source.
Experimental results highlight ratio sensitivities on fuel type(s) present. These ratios
were found from computational sensitivity analysis results on LaBr3(Ce) integral counts
considering detector response. Some ratios yielded clear sensitivities for present fissile/fissionable
fuel indicating viable early-time ratios for rapid fuel type determination. Results of compu-
tational and experimental portions performed well for near immediate attribution indicators
but also displayed limitations.
Peri-detonation nuclear forensics shows promise for contributing to early-time techni-
cal nuclear forensics information used for attribution. Peri-detonation nuclear forensics
is also not without limitations. Collection requirements dictate surviving or existing radi-
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ation monitoring stations. Existing stations are either fortuitously or strategically placed
and also, like other methods, require time for data acquisition and processing. Cost of
implementing and maintaining monitoring stations is likely high, but in terms of nuclear
deterrence is invaluable. Also, early-time sophistication determination is not full-proof.
A crudely designed device could originate from any known and unknown weapons states.
Laboratory analyses would produce more accurate results related to the source by quan-
tifying nuanced characteristics (e.g. enrichment, purity, structural components) in a more
controlled setting.
Segregation into peri- and post-detonation nuclear forensics is necessary because of
the level of information and methods associated with each period. As time progresses,
more characteristics come to light as analysis settings move from the field to laboratory.
Ultimately, policy maker risk tolerance determines if using early-time, oftentimes vague,
indicators containing larger uncertainty is better than using more definitive nuanced indi-
cators, also with uncertainty, that arrive later in time. Peri-detonation signature capabilities
coupled to other relevant information could provide an effective indirect deterrent to so-
phisticated source state proliferation.
5.4 Peri-Detonation Nuclear Forensics Future Work
The phenomena surrounding an urban nuclear device detonation is complex and affects
early-time emissions. These emissions also contain uncertainties related to nuclear data,
experimental setup, phenomena assumptions/approximations. How to minimize these er-
rors while maintaining fidelity and reasonable computation times is a tough problem that
needs to be addressed. What is an acceptable level of error when applied to political action
is an important question that would determine the level of empirical evidence needed for
attribution purposes.
In this research, simplified models were used to demonstrate device design effects and
differences of measurable output. The research can be extended to other designs and pa-
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rameterized into design sensitivities rather than discretized components. The methods were
completed on prompt phenomena up to 60 seconds following detonation but the methods
could easily be extended to sample/particulate collection time frames. An extended ap-
plication time could optimize measurement times for determining device characteristics.
Optimistically, the method could also be tailored for other measurement techniques such as
mass spectrometry, beta, and alpha detection.
Experimentally, fuel-type sensitivities were demonstrated up to 0.01 seconds using
small fractional amounts of 239Pu due to availability. Other fractional ratios of 239Pu should
be explored to better fill the gaps in trends/sensitivities.
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